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STEVEN MCNAMARA†
ABSTRACT
In 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court fundamentally reset the
jurisdictional sweep of U.S. securities law in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank. No longer could foreign plaintiffs access the U.S.
courts if a defendant engaged in conduct in the U.S. affecting
securities prices outside the U.S., or conduct outside the U.S. had a
significant effect on securities prices inside the U.S. Under
Morrison’s new “transactional test” only purchasers of securities on
a U.S. exchange or in a U.S. transaction would be able to bring
securities fraud claim under Section 10(b). The Morrison decision
therefore greatly heightens the importance of alternative non-U.S.
jurisdictions hosting securities fraud lawsuits. Prior to Morrison,
however, the Netherlands had already begun to host global
securities settlements under its statute allowing for the settlement
of mass claims, the Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade
(WCAM). As of 2019, the WCAM has been used to settle global
securities fraud claims in four major cases, including the 1.2 billion
euro settlement in the Fortis case, the largest ever outside the
United States. The WCAM differs in crucial ways from the U.S.
securities fraud class action regime, however. Most importantly,
because the WCAM does not afford plaintiff shareholders a
collective means to sue, the balance of power shifts decisively
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towards the defendant as compared to the American system. A close
look at Morrison and the WCAM settlements to date illustrates that
to some extent the development of this law is an example of
regulatory competition. Indeed, both the U.S. Supreme Court and
the Dutch courts have understood their role as affording differing,
though complementary, systems for solving securities fraud claims.
The theory of regulatory competition is not the only cause driving
the development of a global class action mechanism under Dutch
law, however. The jurisprudential commitments of the Supreme
Court’s conservative wing, as well as principles of justice and the
workings of chance, have also shaped the development of this new
body of law. This Article surveys the WCAM as a mechanism to
settle securities fraud claims, with an eye towards comparing it to
its American counterpart. While critics of the American system will
be heartened by the fact that plaintiffs are deprived of the ability to
launch in terrorem litigation, the Dutch system fails to improve on
the more trenchant flaws of the American securities fraud class
action regime.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 2010 decision in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank shut the U.S. Federal
courthouse doors to securities fraud lawsuits on behalf of
shareholders purchasing securities in foreign transactions.1
As a result, interest in foreign alternatives to the U.S.
securities fraud class action on the part of would-be plaintiffs
and their legal representatives has increased greatly. While
a number of jurisdictions have provisions allowing for mass
claims to be brought before their courts, none of them have
the complete list of factors that make securities class actions
viable in the United States: opt-out class rules, the
possibility of substantial monetary damages, the American
rule for litigation funding (i.e., no “loser pays” or English rule
cost-shifting for unsuccessful plaintiffs), and the fraud-onthe-market standard for demonstrating reliance on a
defendant’s statements.2 Furthermore, of the jurisdictions
that do allow an opt-out mass action in a securities claim,
only the Netherlands has hosted truly global settlements
under something approaching an American-style class action
mechanism.
While Morrison heightens the importance of the Dutch
statute allowing for the settlement of mass claims, its use in
securities cases actually predates Morrison. The Wet
Collectieve Afwikkeling Massachade (the WCAM) was
enacted in 2005, and was first used in a securities settlement
in Shell Petroleum in 2007.3 Since then, three more securities
settlements have been concluded under the WCAM, with the
ongoing Petrobras action as another potential settlement.
1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
2. See John C. Coffee, The Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Law,
Culture, and Incentives, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1895, 1896–97 (2017); Deborah R.
Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party
Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 307–08 (2011).
3. Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 197 m.nt. AFJA Leitjen (Shell
Petroleum NV/Dexia Bank Nederland NV) (Neth.) [hereinafter Shell Petroleum]
(translated by author). See infra notes 121–48 and accompanying text.
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While only five in total, these actions are of major
importance. At 1.2 billion euros Fortis is the largest
securities settlement ever outside the U.S. The value of a
Petrobras settlement would likely exceed that, as the U.S.
action settled for $2.95 billion in 2018.4 Enough securities
cases have now been settled under the WCAM to establish it
as a potential alternative to the American class action where
plaintiffs can no longer access American courts. That said,
the specific requirements of the WCAM shift the leverage in
a settlement negotiation decisively towards the defendants,
so many cases that would have otherwise been viable under
American law will fail to settle under the Dutch statute. The
WCAM does not offer a clean replacement or substitute for
the American class action but rather a more limited
mechanism that gives a conclusive effect to a settlement
otherwise reached by the parties.
The fact that the WCAM offers a more limited avenue to
plaintiffs suggests the central question this Article will
explore: Given the extensively documented flaws of the
American securities fraud class action, to what extent does
the WCAM represent an improvement over its American
counterpart? Does the WCAM avoid at least some of the
problems that call the efficacy of the American securities
class action regime into question while at the same time
offering real benefits to investors and corporations? At first
glance, critics of the American class action may be heartened
by the fact that the Dutch procedure does not offer a classwide cause of action, thereby depriving would-be plaintiffs
and their legal representatives of the ability to launch in
terrorem litigation designed solely to extract a settlement.
The WCAM does shift leverage to the defendants, often
decisively, in the settlement negotiations that will precede
any legal proceedings in the Amsterdam Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, simply shifting advantage to the

4. In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 317 F. Supp. 3d 858, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d,
784 Fed. App’x 10 (2d Cir. 2019).
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defendants, which critics would presumably think a good
thing, does not address the more trenchant criticisms of the
American class action. These center around circularity: due
to the unique structural features of the American securities
class action, any remedy it affords generally involves one
group of shareholders compensating another group. This is
because in a securities class action, one class of shareholders,
generally the long-term, “buy and hold” investors, pays for a
damage award going to shareholders, often short-term
traders, who bought or sold shares during the class period.
And in addition to circularity, up to 50% of the total cost of
administering this remedy will go to the legal fees of
plaintiffs’ and defense counsel. While the problems of a
circular remedy and expensive legal fees are central to the
criticism of the American class action, they are not the only
legitimate complaints. Also important are questions
concerning the efficacy of any deterrent effect the current
regime might have and the incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers
in these cases.
Surveying Morrison and the recent settlements
concluded under the WCAM, this Article comes to the
following conclusions: First, the WCAM offers only a limited
improvement upon the American securities fraud class
action. While offering plaintiffs only a settlement mechanism
and not a cause of action greatly reduces the ability of
plaintiffs to launch “strike suits,” the fundamental
circularity embodied in the American class action remains.
From an economic standpoint, then, the Dutch synthetic
class action represents only a crude sort of improvement over
the American class action. It greatly reduces the incidence of
vexatious litigation, but any settlement concluded will still
be essentially circular. And in radically reducing the amount
of cases, the Dutch regime does away with the compensatory
and other benefits that those settlements do provide in the
U.S., whatever their flaws. Secondly, its deterrent effect is
subject to the same questions and uncertainties as with the
American securities class action. There probably is in fact a
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deterrent effect, and beyond that a symbolic value, in
allowing for securities class actions, but it is difficult to
quantify and will therefore remain open to criticism on
purely economic grounds. Thirdly, the story of Morrison and
the growth of this new alternative is important as a matter
of political economy. It illustrates that growth in the law is
neither purely a matter of economic rationality,
considerations of justice or fairness, or chance, but involves
an admixture of all three. From a political-economic
standpoint it is understandable, and ultimately desirable,
that alternatives for collective litigation are being developed
in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Securities regulation in the real
world is not just a matter of economics narrowly conceived,
but also involves factors that are political and ultimately
moral.
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I. MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK: CLOSING
COURTROOM DOORS

THE

The legal causes contributing to the growth of the Dutch
synthetic securities class action include both Dutch and
American factors. With one exception, the WCAM
settlements concluded so far are the fruit of a series of
parallel securities litigations in the United States and the
Netherlands. Prior to Morrison, non-U.S. shareholders were
dismissed from the U.S. Federal litigation in both Royal
Dutch/Shell5 and Converium,6 while the entire U.S. action
against Fortis was dismissed.7 These three decisions were all
based on the conduct prong of the pre-Morrison “conduct and
effects test,” which gave the Federal courts jurisdiction
where “the defendant’s conduct in the United States was
more than merely preparatory to the fraud . . . .”8 As these
cases demonstrate, the conduct test kept foreign plaintiffs
out of U.S. court where shareholders purchased their shares
abroad and the intrinsic connection of the alleged fraudulent
activity to the United States was weak. In overturning the
conduct and effects test, Morrison goes substantially further.
Its “transactional test” allows a U.S. Federal court
jurisdiction over a 10b-5 claim “only in transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic
transactions in other securities . . . .”9 On the American side,
then, the original legal cause of the WCAM securities
settlement was the restrictive application of the conduct test,
which is now supplanted by Morrison’s far more restrictive
transactional test.

5. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 724
(D.N.J. 2007).
6. In re Scor Holding (Switz.) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
7. Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F.Supp.2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2010).
8. In re Royal Dutch/Shell, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (citing Alfadda v. Fenn,
935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991)).
9. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010).

2020]

GLOBAL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION

487

Morrison is important on a number of levels. By erecting
barriers to lawsuits with significant foreign elements, it
presages the current anti-global moment. Within American
law, it is an important case in a line of decisions
strengthening the presumption against extraterritoriality,
which makes it much more difficult for foreign plaintiffs to
bring cases in United States federal court. 10 It also reflects
the desire of the Supreme Court’s conservative wing to
reduce the litigation risk businesses face, which includes
reducing the sweep of the private right of action under Rule
10b-5.11 And as a matter of jurisprudence, it is most
obviously a repudiation of a body of judge-made law
investing later judges with significant discretion.
A. The Conduct and Effects Test
Prior to Morrison, U.S. courts developed two tests to
determine whether a securities claim with significant foreign
elements could be brought in U.S. court. Together these are
labelled the “conduct and effects test.”12 Under the law
developed by the Second Circuit, and then adopted by the
other circuits, if significant conduct concerning a foreign
securities fraud occurred in the U.S., or a foreign securities
fraud resulted in specific harmful effects on U.S. securities
markets, the U.S. Federal courts had subject matter
jurisdiction in such a case. The development of this law was
prompted by the lack of clear indication in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act or the 1934 Act)
itself as to its extraterritorial application. This lack of clear

10. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016)
(RICO); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (Alien Tort
statute); Microsoft v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (intellectual property); F.
Hoffman -La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (antitrust); EEOC
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (anti-discrimination law). See
generally Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081,
1097–99 (2015).
11. See infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
12. See SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003).
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direction opened the door for Judge Henry Friendly and
others on the Second Circuit to develop a body of judge-made
law. While strong policy reasons supported the conduct and
effects test, and the statutory interpretation supporting it
was plausible, it was still open to criticism on both legal and
policy grounds. Judge Bork, and later Justice Scalia, both
characterized it as an act of judicial legislation.13 Scholars
also criticized it as indeterminate, as well as potentially
leading to comity problems with foreign nations and their
securities regulators.14
The effects prong of the conduct and effects test begins
with Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.15 Schoenbaum had invested
in Banff Oil Ltd., a Canadian company with stock trading on
both the Toronto Stock Exchange and the American Stock
Exchange. Schoenbaum alleged that sales of treasury stock
to its controlling shareholder and a French bank
fraudulently deprived the company of value, because the
directors knew of valuable oil discoveries prior to the sales
which weren’t factored into the price.16 When the District
Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of
lack of subject matter jurisdiction,17 Schoenbaum appealed
and the Second Circuit reversed. Chief Judge Lumbard’s
opinion is grounded in a rather subtle reading of the
Exchange Act. The District Court below focused on Exchange
13. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261; Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d
27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
14. See, e.g., Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities
Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial SubjectMatter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89 (2004); Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities
Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207 (1996); Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman,
Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009
WISC. L. REV. 465 (2009); Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting
the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace,
55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (1992).
15. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
16. Id. at 205.
17. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Act Section 30(b), which specifies that in the absence of SEC
regulations, the Act does not apply “to any person in so far
as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States[.]”18 The Second Circuit
however construes Section 30(b) in light of Section 30(a),
which gives the SEC authority to regulate the overseas
activities of broker-dealers engaging in transactions on
foreign exchanges. The court thus cabins the import of 30(b)
by interpreting it as permitting broker-dealers “to conduct
transactions in securities outside of the United States
without complying with the burdensome reporting
requirement of the Act and without being subject to its
regulatory provisions . . . .”19 On the court’s understanding,
then, Section 30(b) does not imply that there is no
extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act, but rather
that in the absence of SEC rules that would otherwise govern
such activity, broker-dealers are free to transact on foreign
stock exchanges.20 Further support for the Act’s
extraterritorial application is found in SEC interpretations
applying it abroad.21 The Second Circuit thus determines
that foreign transactions resulting in detrimental effects on
the domestic securities markets are subject to the Exchange
Act.
The conduct prong begins four years later with Judge
Friendly’s decision in Leaseco Data Processing Equipment
Corp. v. Maxwell.22 Here, Leaseco alleged that defendant
Maxwell and others fraudulently induced it to purchase $22
million of stock in Pergamon Press in conjunction with a
planned acquisition.23 There were numerous false

18. Id. at 392.
19. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 1968).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 206–07.
22. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d
Cir. 1972).
23. Id. at 1332–33.
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communications concerning Pergamon’s financial condition
and profitability, as well as a rumored outside takeover bid,
all made in an attempt to sell Pergamon at an inflated
price.24 Pergamon was a British company and Leaseco had
purchased the stock on the London Stock Exchange; some of
these misstatements allegedly occurred in the U.S., while
others were made in the U.K.
Judge Friendly begins his analysis by observing that we
are here concerned with the question of the extent to which
a state can regulate conduct within its own borders, not
whether it has prescriptive jurisdiction concerning the
effects of conduct that occurs abroad.25 Looking at both
Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, he observes that neither are limited in their
applicability to the main subject of their respective acts: the
“registration of securities offered for sale by issuers or
underwriters unless the securities or transactions were
exempted”26 in the case of the 1933 Act, and sales of
securities on the organized stock markets for the 1934 Act.27
The next step is to conclude that just as Congress intended
to protect sales of securities not listed “on organized United
States markets, we cannot perceive any reason why it should
have wished to limit the protection to securities of American
issuers.”28 Extending this analysis further, the court asks, as
Justice Stevens later would in Morrison, whether Congress
would have intended the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities law to cover a foreign promoter coming to New
York and making fraudulent claims intending to induce an
American to purchase securities in a foreign company.29

24. Id. at 1331–32.
25. Id. at 1333–34.
26. Id. at 1335.
27. Id. at 1336.
28. Id.
29. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 285 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1336–37.
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Acknowledging that this is close case, the court determines
that the 1934 Act should cover such activity, at least “when
substantial misrepresentations were made in the United
States.”30
Judge Friendly’s decision in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone
Inc.31 is also important for the conduct and effects test.
Bersch purchased shares of I.O.S., Ltd., a Canadian mutual
fund manager, in an offering in the Bahamas.32 The court
was confronted with the question of the degree of conduct or
effects in the U.S. required for extraterritorial application of
the Exchange Act. As for conduct, although “Congress did not
mean the United States to be used as a base for fraudulent
securities schemes even when the victims are foreigners,”
that principle does not extend “to cases where the United
States activities are merely preparatory or take the form of
culpable nonfeasance and are relatively small in comparison
to those abroad.”33 As for the level of effects required, there
is subject matter jurisdiction only when fraudulent acts
committed abroad “result in injury to purchasers or sellers of
. . . securities in whom the United States has an interest, not
where acts simply have an adverse effect on the American
economy or on American investors generally.”34
Bersch is therefore doubly significant. In instructing the
courts to disregard small or de minimis actions, or very
general effects, it invests courts with an important, factintensive role. And in arriving at this position, the Bersch
court itself is engaged in a similar act of judging, but on the
level of statutory interpretation, as were the Schoenbaum
and Leasco courts. The decision balances an assumed general
desire on the part of Congress to protect Americans from
securities fraud, even when a case has significant foreign
30. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1337.
31. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
32. Id. at 980.
33. Id. at 987.
34. Id. at 989.
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circumstances, with an awareness that judicial economy
should preclude considering cases with minimal activity
conducted in the U.S. or only general, diffuse effects on
American markets. It is a sophisticated balancing act that
places the judiciary in a central role, both in its legal function
as construing the meaning of Federal statutes and in the
fact-finding role of a District court judge.
The conduct and effects test begun by Schoenbaum,
Leaseco, and Bersch was adopted by the other Circuits in
varying forms, some more stringent and others more
permissive.35 While it was criticized as indeterminate and
potentially injurious to international comity, Congress never
stepped in to rewrite the law in this area, thereby seemingly
signaling its agreement.36 The test of the Exchange Act’s
extraterritorial application stood as a body of judge-made
law until the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Morrison
v. National Australia Bank.
B. Morrison v. National Australia Bank
In overturning the conduct and effects test, Morrison v.
National Australia Bank shuts the door to securities claims
arising out of foreign transactions. Its transactional test
replaces the conduct and effects tests with a bright-line rule
that allows 10(b) claims concerning “only transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic
transactions in other securities . . . .”37 Morrison is of a piece
with other recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the
ability of foreign plaintiffs to access U.S. courts, with Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the majority driven by his signature
textualist mode of interpretation and its concomitant

35. See Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud Litigation after Morrison
v. National Australia Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance-Based Approach to
Extraterritoriality, 53 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 249, 256–57.
36. As Justice Stevens emphasizes in his Morrison concurrence. See Morrison,
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 278 (2010).
37. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.
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emphasis on legislative supremacy. While the opinion is open
to serious criticism, its transactional test also responds to
real defects in the previous body of caselaw under the
conduct and effects test. By shutting the doors to the U.S.
Federal courts for foreign securities lawsuits, Morrison
greatly increases the importance of the development of
procedural mechanisms applicable to mass claims in
securities suits outside the United States.
The Morrison plaintiffs purchased shares in National
Bank of Australia (“NAB”), an Australian company, on the
Australian Stock Exchange.38 (While NAB also had
American Depositary Shares, or ADRs, trading on the New
York Stock Exchange, these were not at issue in the
lawsuit.39) In 1998 NAB purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc.,
a Florida company engaged in the American mortgage
servicing business.40 As a mortgage servicer, its value was
dependent upon the mortgage servicing rights it possessed.
When these were written down by $450 million in July 2001,
and a further $1.75 billion in September 2001, investors
brought a securities fraud suit against its parent, NAB. They
alleged that HomeSide had manipulated the financial
models used to value the mortgage-servicing rights, and that
even after senior executives at both NAB and HomeSide
became aware of misstatements based on these models, they
failed to correct them.41
Because some of the conduct that occurred during the
38. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d,
561 U.S. 247 (2010). Robert Morrison, who was dismissed as a plaintiff in the
case before it reached the Supreme Court, was an American who purchased ADRs
in National Australia Bank on the New York Stock Exchange, while the
remaining three plaintiffs were Australians who had purchased their shares
abroad. National Australia Bank’s Ordinary Shares traded on the Australian
Stock Exchange as well as the Tokyo and London Stock Exchanges. Id. at 168.
39. See Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the
Future of Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.
J. 537, 564–66 (2011).
40. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 251.
41. Id. at 252.
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alleged fraud took place in the United States, plaintiffs
hoped to bring their case under the “conduct” prong of the
conduct and effects test. Morrison was a so-called “F-cubed”
(or “foreign cubed”) case, involving a foreign plaintiff
purchasing shares in a foreign company on a foreign stock
exchange.42 As such, it was the type of case with the least
obvious connection to the United States.43 The Southern
District of New York found that the activities in the United
States were “at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall
securities fraud” and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss
on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.44 The
Second Circuit affirmed,45 and plaintiffs appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion begins by recasting
what had long been understood as a question of subject
matter jurisdiction into a merits question: “But to ask what
conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b)
prohibits, which is a merits question.”46 The practical import
of this is to convert the Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction into a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.47
The recasting is important on a jurisprudential level as well,
however. The transformation of a jurisdictional question into
a merits one deprives a lower court of the ability to determine
sua sponte as a matter of “adjudicative jurisdiction” whether

42. See Beyea, supra note 39, at n. 3 (crediting Stuart M. Grant and Diane
Zilka for coining the term “Foreign Cubed” lawsuit to refer to suits brought by
foreign plaintiffs concerning the stock of foreign companies traded on foreign
exchanges in their article The Role of Foreign Investors in Federal Securities
Class Actions, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
NUMBER B-1442 93, 96 (Practicing L. Inst. ed., 2004)).
43. See Beyea, supra note 39, at 539.
44. In re Nat’l Aust. Bank Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94162, at *25
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
45. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 561
U.S. 247 (2010).
46. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254.
47. Id.
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it has authority to hear a case.48 Re-casting the (formerly)
jurisdictional question as a merits question converts it into a
matter of prescriptive jurisdiction, where the legislature
holds sway.49 Now Congress, not the judiciary, possesses the
proper authority to determine whether or not a given case
falls under the securities law. Recasting the jurisdictional
question as a merits question supports the opinion’s politics
of legislative supremacy.50
After correcting this “threshold error,” Morrison then
turns to the question of the extraterritorial application of the
Exchange Act. In the cases formulating the conduct and
effects test, “the Second Circuit had excised the presumption
against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence of § 10(b)
and replaced it with the inquiry whether it would be
reasonable (and hence what Congress would have wanted) to
apply the statute in a given situation.”51 Quoting Judge Bork,
the majority observes “that rather than courts’ ‘divining
what Congress would have wished’ if it had addressed the
problem[, a] more natural inquiry might be what jurisdiction
Congress in fact thought about and conferred.”52 The Court
then reviews three provisions of the Exchange Act. The
definition of “interstate commerce” includes “trade,
commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between
any foreign country and any State.”53 EEOC v. Aramco
however pointed out that the Court had “repeatedly held that

48. See Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1312 (2014).
49. See Maria Slobodchikova, Private Right of Action in Transactions with
Cross-Border Security-Based Swaps, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 739, 753–56
(2016).
50. See Lea Brilmayer, New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against
Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 666–67 (2011).
51. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257.
52. Id. at 260 (quoting Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32
(D.C. Cir. 1987)).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (2012).

496

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

even statutes that contain broad language in their
definitions of ‘commerce’ that expressly refer to ‘foreign
commerce’ do not apply abroad.”54 Next, Section 2(2) of the
Exchange Act states that “prices established and offered in
such transactions are generally disseminated and quoted”
abroad.55 The antecedent of “such transactions” was
transactions on U.S. exchanges, however, and the Court
determines that this is not enough to support a foreign
application. Finally, the Court analyzes Section 30 of
Exchange Act, interpreting it as the District court in
Schoenbaum had.56 Section 30(b) states that “[t]he provisions
of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder
shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a
business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United
States” unless he does so in violation of regulations
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission “to
prevent the evasion of [the Act].”57 In the interpretation of
the Solicitor General, and Judge Lumbard writing for the
Second Circuit in Schoenbaum, this passage presumes that
the Act does apply abroad in the first instance.58 The
Morrison majority rejects this view, stating that it would be
odd to indicate the extraterritorial application of the entire
statute in such a roundabout manner.59 Furthermore, § 30(a)
does specify that the provisions of the Act shall apply
extraterritorially when a broker or dealer uses a foreign
exchange to effect a transaction that would be impermissible
on a U.S. exchange.60 The majority opinion agrees with the
District Court in Schoenbaum, holding that the Exchange
54. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 262-63 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 251 (1991)).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2) (2012).
56. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
57. 15 U.S. § 78dd(b) (2012).
58. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 263–64; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,
207–08 (2d Cir. 1968).
59. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264.
60. Id. at 264–65.
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Act does not apply extraterritorially.61
Even though the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies, the facts of Morrison concern the conduct prong of
the conduct and effects test. Because some of the allegedly
fraudulent activity took place within the United States, the
Court engages in a further inquiry, asking after the “focus”
of the statute and whether it should apply in this case.62 The
Court finds that the “focus” of the 1934 Act is “not upon the
place where the deception originated, but upon purchases
and sales of securities in the United States.”63 With this
determination, the court finds that the Exchange Act does
not apply here. It then announces the new transactional test
to replace the conduct and effects test: “And it is in our view
only such transactions in securities listed on domestic
exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to
which § 10(b) applies.”64
C. The Political Economy of Morrison
Morrison is a landmark case in American securities law,
and has received significant attention from both academics
and practictioners in the decade since it was handed down.
For purposes of this Article, there are four principal points
to note: first, from the American side, the restrictive
application of the conduct and effects test and then Morrison
are primary legal causes of the development of non-U.S.
securities class actions. They are however negative causes in
the sense that they do not themselves enable this
development, but merely spur it on. Second, the Morrison
61. Id. at 265.
62. Commentators have focused criticism of the Morrison opinion on this step;
see, e.g., Brilmayer, supra n.50, at 661–66; Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified
Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1045 (2011); Franklin A.
Gevurtz, An Introduction to the Symposium and an Examination of Morrison’s
Impact on the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 173, 176–77 (2014).
63. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.
64. Id. at 267.
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opinion itself appears to be primarily driven by Justice
Scalia’s jurisprudential commitments, not economic ones,
including even matters of “judicial economy.” Third, the
transactional test can simultaneously be understood as
implementing a theory of regulatory competition advocated
by law and economics scholars as part of their criticism of the
U.S. securities class action. Fourth, the concept of
territoriality embodied in Morrison is a throwback to 19th
century jurisdictional conceptions.
First, the complete closing of the courtroom doors by
Morrison is the key legal factor driving the development of
alternatives to the U.S. securities fraud class action in the
past decade. While a number of countries did include some
form of class action mechanism in their laws prior to
Morrison, its effect has been to prompt entrepreneurial
lawyers to test these other jurisdictions. This has brought
about what Professor Coffee terms the “synthetic class
action,” which uses the Dutch WCAM settlement mechanism
in combination with third-party funding structures to arrive
at what functionally amounts to a class action covering nonU.S. investors in multi-national corporations.65 While the
Netherlands is the most important site for non-U.S. class
actions, and is the focus of Part II of this Article, noteworthy
cases have also occurred in Japan, Canada, Australia,
Germany, and the U.K.66 Had Morrison not closed the doors
to the U.S. courts for foreign investors, this period of legal
experimentation and rapid development would likely not

65. See Zachary D. Clopton, The Global Class Action and Its Alternatives, 19
THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 125 (2018); Deborah R. Hensler, From Sea to Shining
Sea: How and Why Class Actions are Spreading Globally, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 965
(2017); see also Bookman, supra note 10, at 1115–16; John C. Coffee, The
Globalization of Securities Litigation, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/09/19/the-globalization-of-securitieslitigation.
66. See David H. Kistenbroker, Joni S. Jacobsen & Angela M. Liu, Global
Securities Litigation Trends, DECHERT LLP (July 2019), https://www.dechert.com/
knowledge/onpoint/2017/11/developments-in-global-securities-litigation.html.
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have occurred.67 Morrison is therefore the key negative cause
of the growth in global securities class actions. It doesn’t
itself enable or allow these claims, but by forcing plaintiffs
and their counsel to explore jurisdictions other than the U.S.
it spurred their development.
Second, the majority opinion in Morrison is obviously
motivated by Justice Scalia’s larger jurisprudential
commitments. These are most famously to a textual mode of
statutory interpretation as well as to the principle of
legislative supremacy. While the Morrison majority’s
exercise of statutory interpretation is open to criticism,
courts have struggled since the 1960s with the question of
the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law.68 The
Second Circuit’s reading of the 1934 Act is subtle and nonobvious, relying on a roundabout interpretation of Section 30
to argue that Congress implicitly intended the Act to apply
abroad. By focusing on the statute and failing to find any
clear indication that Congress intended the 1934 Act to apply
abroad,69 Justice Scalia is using his familiar method of
focusing on the text of a law itself to divine its meaning. This

67. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1900.
68. The Schoenbaum Court discusses both Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) and Ferraioli v. Cantor, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 91, 615
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), which the District Court below relied on. See Schoenbaum, 405
F.2d at 208. Both these cases rejected the extraterritorial application of the 1934
Act; the Second Circuit believed that Kook properly interpreted Sec. 30(b) to
disallow application of Sec. 7(c) of the 1934 Act, while Ferraioli extended this too
far in holding that an isolated transaction in Canada was not subject to the Act.
See also Zoelsch, v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31–33 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality but ultimately deferring
to the Second Circuit). For development of the argument that the 1934 Act should
not apply extraterritorially, see Margaret V. Sachs, The International Reach of
Rule 10b-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 677
(1990).
69. Whether or not the majority is hereby instituting a “clear statement rule”
is in dispute in Morrison. Compare the majority’s declaration that “Subsection
30(a) contains what § 10(b) lacks: a clear statement of extraterritorial effect,”
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265, with Justice Stevens’s claim that “the Court seeks to
transform the presumption from a flexible rule of thumb into something more
like a clear statement rule.” Id. at 278.
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is in direct contrast to Judge Friendly’s “purposive” mode of
interpretation in Leaseco and Bersch.70 The decision also
furthers Justice Scalia’s commitment to legislative
supremacy by depriving lower Federal court judges of the
discretion to determine whether a foreign securities case
meets the threshold for subject matter jurisdiction in U.S.
court.
Behind these jurisprudential commitments also sits a
political commitment of the modern conservative legal
movement, of which Justice Scalia was the most important
figure. This is the goal of raising the barriers to lawsuits
against corporate defendants that are perceived as meritless
or frivolous.71 As Justice Stevens notes in his Morrison
concurrence—in the judgment only, and really a dissent—
the majority opinion is part of a sweep of securities law
decisions trimming back the private right of action under
Rule 10b-5.72 Such decisions include Central Bank of
Denver73 and Stoneridge74 as well as more recent cases

70. See Boehm, supra note 35, at 254–55. Of course, it is Judge Friendly’s
creation of the conduct and effects test after considering what “Congress would
have wanted” that is the target of Justice Scalia’s criticism. Morrison, 561 U.S.
at 255–61.
71. See Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market:
Reflections on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37,
40 (2015); Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63
S.C. L. REV. 465, 477 (2012); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006); Bookman, supra note 10, at 1085,
1107. A crucial victory for this movement was the passage of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). See John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534–36 (2006).
72. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 286 (quoting his dissent in Stoneridge Inv. Partners
v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 175 (2008)); cf. John C. Coates IV, Securities
Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015)
(noting that securities law cases in the Roberts court have been “significantly
more ‘expansive’” than in the Powell era).
73. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164 (1994).
74. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.
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including Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.75 and
Janus Capital Group76 (though not Halliburton II,77 which
preserves the reliance presumption). Furthermore, such
decisions are of a piece with decisions by the Roberts court in
the areas of civil procedure and class action claims, which
continue the trend begun under the Rehnquist court to
restrict the ability of plaintiffs to bring claims in federal
court against business defendants.78 Morrison therefore may
not only be motivated by matters of jurisprudence, but also
by what can be termed matters of political economy—the
commitment of the conservative judicial movement to
restrict the ability of plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring cases in
federal court against corporate defendants.
Even though the jurisprudential commitments of the
conservative wing of the Court most obviously drive
Morrison, its transactional test is commensurate with the
criticism of class action lawsuits pursued by law and
economics scholars since the 1980s.79 Professors Choi and
Guzman, and Romano, among others, have all advocated for
a system of regulatory competition in the area of securities
law.80 Just as the states could be seen as offering competing
legal regimes for corporate law, these scholars advocated for
75. 551 U.S. 308, 328–29 (2007).
76. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 146–
48 (2011).
77. Erica John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton II), 563 U.S. 804,
811–13 (2011).
78. See Coates, supra note 72, at 3.
79. See Beyea, supra note 39, at 550–51, 558–60 (citing Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities
Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 219–39 (1996) and Choi & Silberman, supra
note 14, at 480–88).
80. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking
the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); see
generally Stephen Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA.
J. INT’L L. 815 (2001); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L. J. 2359 (1998); Roberta Romano,
The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRY L. 387 (2001).
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a similar system in securities law. This could occur through
a legal regime that allowed issuers to choose the level of
securities regulation that would apply to them, or through
transnational competition in securities regulation. By
limiting the protections of the 1934 Act to investors
purchasing securities in United States-based transactions,
the transactional test can be seen as instantiating this
theory.81 Because only these transactions would be covered,
issuers would now have the choice in deciding where to list
their securities. If they believed investors would be better off
without the protections of U.S. securities law, and the
attendant costs of defending against securities class action
lawsuits, they would have the choice not to sell their
securities in U.S.-based transactions.82 The transactional
test therefore is a step in the direction of allowing issuer and
investor choice in securities law, and so can be seen as
implementing the theory of regulatory competition in
securities law put forward by law and economics scholars.83
Finally, it is important to note that the conception of
territoriality embodied in the transactional test is a
throwback to a nineteenth century conception.84 Whether
conceived of as a question on the merits or of subject matter
jurisdiction, a test that rests on a firm distinction between
what is inside U.S. borders and everything else sits in
tension, sometimes severe, with modern financial practice.85

81. See Beyea, supra note 39, at n.86; Choi & Silberman, supra note 14.
82. There is evidence to suggest that in fact investors do not value the private
right of action against international corporations. See John Armour, et al.,
Investor Choice in Global Securities Markets 42 (EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST.,
WORKING PAPER NO. 371, 2017); Amir N. Licht, et al., What Makes Bonding Stick?
A Natural Experiment Involving the U.S. Supreme Court and Cross-Listed Firms
31 (EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., WORKING PAPER NO. 524, 2017).
83. See Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice
of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
97 MINN. L. REV. 132, 142 (2012).
84. Bookman, supra note 10, at 1098; see Colangelo, supra note 62, at 1080.
85. See Edward Greene & Arpan Patel, Consequences of Morrison v. NAB,
Securities Litigation and Beyond, 11 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 145, 159–60 (2016); see also
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While the recent cases reviving the presumption against
extraterritoriality depend on a clear border between what is
inside and outside the U.S., in drawing this line in twentyfirst
century
financial
law
Morrison
represents
86
“extraterritoriality on steroids.” While beyond the scope of
this Article, many of the difficulties of applying Morrison to
the world of contemporary finance stem from fact patterns
where it is not clear what—if any—jurisdiction a transaction
occurs in.87 Part of the significance of Morrison then is that
it attempts to erect firm borders in a globalizing world.88
Indeed, Morrison, and the strengthening of the presumption
against extraterritoriality more generally, can be seen as a
precursor to the current anti-global moment we are now
witnessing in many polities across the world.

Armour et al., supra note 82, at 9–11 (discussing how technological development
causes geographic proximity to decrease in importance).
86. Colangelo, A Unified Approach, supra note 62, at 1057.
87. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Remedies for Foreign Investors under U.S.
Federal Securities Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 167 (2012); Christopher
Calfee, Can’t See the Forest for the Trees: Where Does a Purchase or Sale of
Securities Occur?, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 153, 154–55 (2012).
88. See Amir Licht, Liability for Transnational Securities Fraud, Quo Vadis?
31 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 272, 2014).
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II. THE DUTCH MASS SETTLEMENT MECHANISM AND THE
GROWTH OF THE GLOBAL SECURITIES SETTLEMENT
While Morrison incentivizes shareholders and their
representatives to look for alternatives to the American
securities fraud class action, the implementation of legal
mechanisms allowing for mass claims in non-U.S.
jurisdictions is the positive factor leading to the development
of the global securities class action. While a number of
jurisdictions potentially allow for these claims, so far the
most important one has been the Netherlands. Not only is
the Dutch WCAM flexible and easy to use when companies
and shareholder representatives agree on a settlement, the
liberal interpretation of its jurisdictional requirements by
the Amsterdam Court of Appeals has allowed for truly global
settlements. Part II below first surveys the main features of
the WCAM, and then takes an in-depth look at its application
in securities fraud cases so far.
A. The WCAM Mechanism
The Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massachade was
originally enacted to provide the manufacturer of the
synthetic hormone DES a means to settle the many claims
that arose after children were born with birth defects to
mothers using the drug.89 DES presented a classic mass tort
situation, where thousands of children were born with birth
defects caused by the drug. While originally added to the
Dutch Civil Code (and the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure) to
allow for settlement of this type of claim in a manner which
would provide compensation to the victims and finality to the
wrongdoer, the WCAM was not restricted to mass tort cases
and was soon applied to other types of claims.
89. See Bart Krans, The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages,
27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 281, 284 (2014). The DES case was
settled in 2006. See Hof’s-Amsterdam 1 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 461 m.nt.
(Foundation Centre DES et al.) (Neth.). The WCAM comprises Articles 7:907–
910 of the Dutch Civil Code [hereinafter, DCC] and Article 1013 of the Dutch
Code of Civil Procedure [hereinafter, DCCP] (translated by author).
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Because it only allows for a settlement, and not a
collective action determining liability, it is fundamentally
different from the class action lawsuit that American
lawyers are familiar with under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.90 Although a proposal to allow for legal
actions that would determine damages in mass claims was
introduced in the Dutch Parliament in 2016,91 the WCAM
itself does not give would-be plaintiffs that right. Its scope is
more modest: It allows the parties to a settlement agreement
to petition the Court of Appeals in Amsterdam, bypassing the
Court of First Instance, to declare the agreement binding
between the parties.92 While this procedure is far more
limited than what American lawyers think of as a class
action lawsuit, its limited nature has actually allowed it to
function effectively as the vehicle to resolve mass claims on
a global scale in certain cases. A look at its essential legal
features illustrates why this is so.
First, because all parties to a Settlement Agreement are
required to petition the court to declare the settlement
binding, it requires that the parties themselves agree to
conclude the dispute before the courts become involved.93
Under the WCAM, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals only
gives a mutually agreed upon settlement effect. If the parties
can agree, the settlement is presumably mutually beneficial
to all parties given the factual and legal context of the
dispute. The parties to the settlement will be an association
(Stichting) or foundation (the Dutch Association for
Shareholders, Vereniging voor Effectenbezitters or “VEB” is a

90. See Hensler, supra note 65, at 971 (“Variations in Class Action Design”).
91. See Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk & Bart van Heeswijk, Netherlands,
CLASS ACTIONS L. REV. 133–36 (2019).
92. DCCP 1013(3). Standing in a WCAM action is limited to a foundation or
association. See Ianika Tzankova, Everything You Wanted to Know about Dutch
Foundations but Never Dared to Ask: A Checklist for Investors (Tilburg L. Sch.
Legal Stud. Res. Papers Series, Working Paper No. 04, 2016), http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2730618.
93. See Krans, supra note 89, at 287.
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foundation involved in the settlements discussed below) set
up to represent the interests of those who have suffered
harm, and the parties that have (allegedly) caused the
harm.94 The association or foundation can bring a legal
action for a declaratory judgment to determine the liability
of defendants on an opt-in basis, but such a proceeding is not
required to bring a settlement before the Amsterdam court.95
(Nor would the result of such an action have res judicata
effect in another action.96) By making the involvement of the
court dependent on the mutual agreement of the parties, any
settlement reached is presumably mutually beneficial, given
the alternatives.97 If any party does not agree to a proposed
settlement, it cannot be declared binding by the court.
A number of factors incentivize the shareholder
representatives to accept an agreement. Perhaps most
important is that after a settlement is declared binding, if
parties who would be beneficiaries under the settlement do
not opt out within a specified time period they will be barred
from bringing a separate claim.98 Because the WCAM is an
“opt-out” mechanism, not an opt-in one as is typical
elsewhere outside the U.S.,99 it automatically operates to
include individual beneficiaries of the settlement after it has
been given binding effect by the Court. 100 On the side of the
party allegedly causing the harm, there can also be strong

94. DCC 7:907(1).
95. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1903–04. Such an action would be brought
under DCC 3:305. See Tjeenk & Heeswijk, supra note 91, at 135–36.
96. See Tomas Arons & Willem H. van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese:
Exporting Mass Securities Claim Settlements from the Netherlands, EUR. BUS. L.
REV. 857, 864 (2010).
97. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1906.
98. See Willem H. Van Boom, Collective Settlements of Mass Claims in the
Netherlands, in AUF DEM WEG ZU EINER EUROPÄISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE 171, 185
(Matthias Casper et al. eds., 2009).
99. Hensler, supra note 65, at 974 (stating that Australia, Canada, and Israel
follow the U.S. in having opt-out procedures).
100. See Tjeenk & Heeswijk, supra note 91, at 132.
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incentives to settle. Most important is finality. Because of its
opt-out nature, defendants who settle under the WCAM are
given peace of mind that the large majority of potential
claims will be settled.101 Once a settlement is declared
binding, potential plaintiffs who have not opted out after the
end of the opt-out period set by the court, usually three to six
months, are barred from bringing claims.102 Furthermore,
the fact that a settlement is made independently of any
substantive legal action means that defendants willing to
settle are not subject to the risks of American-style
discovery.103 While Dutch law contains only limited discovery
obligations, a settlement sidesteps the risks of discovery
altogether.104 For both plaintiffs and defendants, then, a
settlement under the WCAM can be attractive.
The fee structures in WCAM settlements also incentivize
working towards a settlement. While Dutch rules concerning
legal practice forbid contingency fees, they do not prevent
third party litigation funding.105 American law firms
specializing in class actions have therefore been able to
create funding structures that effectively surmount the
prohibition on contingency fee lawyering in the
Netherlands.106 An American law firm can act as a matchmaker between the Dutch stichtings or foundations
representing the interested parties, a law firm in the

101. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1906.
102. See Tjeenk & Heeswijk, supra note 91, at 136–37.
103. An exception to this general principle would be when parties representing
Dutch entities have access to discovery materials available in a parallel litigation
in the U.S. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Class-Action ‘Mash-Up’: In Re Royal
Dutch/Shell Transport Securities Litigation, CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT 178
(Deborah R. Hensler et al. eds., 2016).
104. See Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk & Dennis Horeman, The Netherlands, in
4 SECURITIES LITIGATION REVIEW 207 (William Savitt ed., 2018) (detailing limited
discovery available in Dutch civil procedure).
105. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1904–05; see Tjeenk & Heeswijk, supra note 91,
at 136.
106. For an in-depth look at how this developed, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE (2015).
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Netherlands bringing the settlement to the Amsterdam
Court, and third-party litigation funders such as hedge
funds. The Dutch law firm is paid its standard hourly rate,
regardless of success. The Dutch courts however allow for the
other parties (i.e., the American law firm and the third-party
funders) to be paid out of the amount of the settlement
award. In Converium the courts specifically allowed fees of
20% of the total award, and justified this decision on the
basis of the typical American practice.107 Financially then,
the WCAM really is a “synthetic” class action insofar as it
allows the replication of the American financial incentives
for plaintiffs’ representatives in bringing a claim in the first
place.
The web of Dutch and European Union jurisdictional
rules at stake and the Amsterdam Court’s flexible approach
to their implementation are also critical.108 While the
Netherlands does have a number of important global
enterprises, and some of the key parties to the settlements
so far have been businesses domiciled (or with very
substantial business) in the Netherlands, it is a small
country. The primary jurisdictional challenge then is for the
Court to legitimately claim jurisdiction over parties to the
agreement that are not located there. While some of the mass
tort actions the WCAM was intended to apply to have all, or
mostly, Dutch “interested parties,” in the securities fraud
settlements this is generally not the case. In Converium, for
example, only 3% of the shareholders who would benefit from
the settlement were domiciled in the Netherlands.109
Before outlining the jurisdictional bases used in the
WCAM settlements, a terminological point is important. In
107. See infra notes 176–78 and accompanying text.
108. See generally HÉLÈNE VAN LITH, THE DUTCH SETTLEMENT ACT AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 32–33, 48 (2010); Xandra E. Kramer, Securities Collective
Action and Private International Law Issues in Dutch WCAM Settlements: Global
Aspirations and Regional Boundaries, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV.
L.J. 235, 237–38 (2014).
109. See infra notes 166–74 and accompanying text.
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the Court’s decisions approving the settlements discussed
below, the parties bringing the settlement action before the
court are termed “petitioners,” while the parties who would
be bound by it are termed “defendants” or “interested
parties” (belanghebbenden).110 To American ears at least,
this is confusing, because “defendants” here denotes the
shareholders who would be the plaintiffs in an American
class action. The reason for this awkward use of terminology
stems from a mismatch between the WCAM statute and the
Brussels Regulation governing cross-border litigation.111
Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation governing international
legal claims allows for “general jurisdiction at the court of
the place of the domicile of the ‘person to be sued.’”112 Despite
the awkward fit, Article 2 of Brussels I provides Dutch courts
with jurisdiction over the settlement action where at least
one of the “defendants” is located in the Netherlands.
There are three principal routes by which the
Amsterdam court can assume jurisdiction. For Dutch
parties, jurisdiction comes under Article 2(1) of the Brussels
I Regulation on Enforcement of Judgments. As stated above,
jurisdiction over a person “to be sued” is proper in the courts
where she is domiciled.113 For non-Dutch parties domiciled
in the European Union or a country that is a member of the
Lugano Convention (Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway),
jurisdiction is proper under Art. 6(1) of the Brussels I
Regulation:
A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 1. Where
he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where

110. See van Lith, supra note 108, at 39; Kramer, supra note 108, at 250–51,
259 (explaining the reason for this and then observing that “[i]t is submitted that
this approach is highly questionable.”).
111. See Kramer, supra note 108, at 251; see also Arons & van Boom, supra
note 96, at 876–77; Thijs Bosters, Goals of the Brussels Regulation Regarding
Jurisdiction, in COLLECTIVE REDRESS AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
E.U. 165 (2017).
112. Art. 2 para. 1 EC.
113. Id.
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any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together
to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate
proceedings . . . .114

Finally, for non-Dutch, non-E.U., and non-Lugano
Convention persons, jurisdiction comes under Art. 3 of the
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, “Legal Proceedings initiated
by a petition.” Article 3(a) provides for jurisdiction if either
the petitioner, or one of them if there are more than one, is
domiciled in the Netherlands.115 And Article 3(c) is a catchall provision that provides jurisdiction where “the legal
proceedings are otherwise sufficiently connected with the
Dutch legal sphere.”116
A final key aspect of the WCAM is its inherent flexibility
as to the legal liability, if any, underlying a claim.117 While
Dutch procedural law will apply to the settlement agreement
itself, and E.U. and international law to the enforceability of
a settlement, the substantive legal liability at stake in a
claim can come from any jurisdiction. Because the parties to
the settlement craft the agreement itself, and merely bring
it before the Amsterdam Court, the underlying basis for the
claim can be based on any jurisdiction’s law, or the law of
multiple jurisdictions. While this can result in difficulties
concerning differing amounts of compensation provided to
different classes of plaintiffs in the Schedule appended to the
settlement,118 it allows the WCAM maximum flexibility to
implement a settlement without forcing the Court into
conflict of laws issues. Combined with the incentives the

114. Id. at 6(1).
115. DCCP Art. 3(a).
116. DCCP Art. 3(c); see van Lith, supra note 108, at 47–48.
117. The fact that the part of the WCAM statute in the Dutch Civil Code is
located in Book 7 dealing with contracts signals that it grounded in contract, not
tort. There is therefore no requirement as to the underlying legal basis for
liability, but rather simply an agreement of the parties to settle a dispute. See
Arons & van Boom, supra note 96, at 868.
118. See Krans, supra note 89, at 285 (discussing damage scheduling).
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various parties have to enter into the agreement, this
flexibility with respect to the underlying liability at stake is
essential to creating a truly global class action.
B. Securities Settlements under the WCAM
The WCAM was added to the Dutch Civil Code and Code
of Civil Procedure in 2005, and the Amsterdam Court of
Appeals has approved on average two settlements per year
in the period 2005–2014.119 Four of the settlements concern
securities fraud allegations and so represent global synthetic
securities class actions. The progression of these cases shows
a pattern of increasing jurisdictional sweep, as well as an
increase in value up to $1.2 billion euros in the 2018 Fortis
settlement. The ongoing Petrobras litigation presents
another potentially very important case. Not only might its
settlement value exceed that of Fortis, but in a preliminary
action to determine liability brought under Article 3:305 of
the DCC the Rotterdam Court of First Instance recently
declined to honor an arbitration clause in the corporate
charter that Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New
York upheld in the parallel U.S. securities class action.120
The securities settlements so far show the Amsterdam
Appeals Court becoming more comfortable with an expansive
application of governing jurisdictional law, as well as a
pattern of increasing settlement values. Two recent failed
attempts at settlements however demonstrate the need for
caution on the part of shareholders and their attorneys.
Despite the willingness of the courts to interpret
jurisdictional and other requirements of the WCAM statute
liberally, when the parties can’t agree to a settlement,
shareholders have little leverage to press a claim.

119. See Focus on Collective Redress: The Netherlands, THE BRIT. INST. OF INT’L
& COMP. L., https://www.collectiveredress.org/collective-redress/reports/thenethe
rlands/caselaw.
120. See discussion infra Section II.B.4.
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1. Shell Petroleum
Shell Petroleum began when the company announced
restatements of its oil reserves previously put forward in its
securities filings. During the period 1998–2002, Royal
Dutch/Shell (“RDS”) managers were extremely aggressive in
booking oil reserves.121 Similar to some of the more familiar
accounting scandals from the early 2000s, this amounted to
an exercise in hoping that future performance would justify
the very optimistic numbers posted. When SEC guidelines
clarified how oil and natural gas reserves were to be
accounted for, the company was forced to lower its estimate
of its reserves by a total of 4.47 billion barrels, or 23% of
reserves as earlier stated.122 The effect of the series of
restatements in early 2004 was a $13.84 billion loss in
market capitalization.123
Plaintiffs quickly filed suit in the District Court of New
Jersey. Due to the Third Circuit’s liberal interpretation of the
conduct test, plaintiffs’ counsel Stanley Bernstein of
Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshitz hoped that the court would
allow a global class of shareholders.124 Bernstein’s aggressive
lawyering, however, dissuaded RDS’s General Counsel from
offering a settlement.125 Instead, the company fought back,
arguing that the non-U.S. plaintiffs should be dismissed.126
The court initially rejected Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.127 As the
case progressed in U.S. court, RDS opened discussions with
Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., the U.S. law firm representing two
large Dutch pension funds that were considering opting out

121. See In re: Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 509, 527–
30 (D.N.J. 2005).
122. Id. at 517.
123. Id.
124. See Hensler, supra note 103, at 175.
125. See id. at 177–78.
126. In re Royal Dutch, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
127. Id.
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of the class action.128 These negotiations were a prelude to
the settlement of the claims of both U.S. and non-U.S.
investors. In 2007, a special master, appointed by Judge
Pisano, recommended dismissing the non-U.S. plaintiffs due
to insufficient conduct on the part of RDS in the U.S. to meet
the conduct test.129 In conjunction with the negotiation of a
settlement offer and its acceptance by the Amsterdam Court
of Appeals, Judge Pisano granted defendants’ motion to
dismiss the non-U.S. plaintiffs.130
Shell Petroleum131 is important as both the first
securities settlement brought under the WCAM and the
beginning of a line of parallel securities claims in U.S. courts
and the Netherlands.132 In addition to simply being the first
settlement given effect under the WCAM, the treatment of
jurisdictional issues by the Dutch court and the bargaining
position of the parties are important. The direct parties to
the settlement includ the two Royal Dutch/Shell entities, a
stichting or foundation formed to represent shareholders, the
VEB (Vereniging von Effectenbezitters or Dutch Investors
Association), and foundations representing two Dutch
pension funds. For the direct parties to the settlement, Shell
Petroleum N.V. (a Dutch Company), Shell Transport and
Trading Company Ltd. (a U.K. corporation), as well as the
shareholder representatives, jurisdiction is not an issue as
they are applicants petitioning the court for a binding
declaration.133 The court does, however, discuss its

128. See Hensler, A Class Action Mash-Up, supra note 103, at 178.
129. See In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 714
(D.N.J. 2007).
130. Id. at 723–24.
131. Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 197 m.nt. AFJA Leitjen (Shell
Petroleum NV/Dexia Bank Nederland NV) (Neth.) [hereinafter Shell Petroleum]
(translated by author).
132. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 83, at 154–55 (discussing the phenomenon
of parallel or “piggyback” securities litigations in different national courts).
133. See Shell Petroleum ¶ 5.1. Although the decision here does not specifically
cite Art. 6(1) of the Brussels Regulation, the Court’s reference to a “close
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jurisdiction over the U.K. RDS entity, Shell Transport and
Trading Company Ltd., under the Brussels I Regulation. The
court finds that jurisdiction over the U.K. company is proper
on account of the required “close connection” between the
claims concerning Shell Petroleum N.V. and Shell Transport
and Trading Company Ltd.134
Finding jurisdiction over the “interested parties” in the
settlement, who would be the plaintiffs in an American class
action, presents a more complex but by no means
insurmountable challenge. As noted above, a mass action
with many plaintiffs presents an awkward fit with both
Dutch and European civil procedure.135 The Amsterdam
court surmounts this problem by conceiving of the interested
parties, i.e., the shareholders, as defendants.136 The court
distinguishes three categories of interested parties: those in
the Netherlands, those outside of the Netherlands but in an
E.U. member or Lugano Convention country, and everyone
else. The numbers of these three categories of “interested
persons” or shareholders with addresses known to the
applicants were 798 in the Netherlands,137 103,685 in the
U.K.,138 and 7,105 others.139 That leaves approximately
400,000 with unknown addresses.140 The Shell Petroleum
court interprets the applicable jurisdictional rules in an
expansive manner, thereby allowing it to give effect to a
settlement covering hundreds of thousands of shareholders
not in the E.U., other Lugano convention countries, or the
U.S.
connection” indicates that is the provision giving it jurisdiction over the U.K.
entity. See also VAN LITH, supra note 108, at 33.
134. See Shell Petroleum, ¶ 5.26; see also Kramer, supra note 108, at 254; VAN
LITH, supra note 108, at 33.
135. See notes 110–12 supra and accompanying text.
136. See Shell Petroleum, ¶ 5.10(b).
137. Id., ¶ 5.10(a).
138. Id., ¶ 5.10(b).
139. Id., ¶ 5.10(c).
140. Id., ¶ 5.13.
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The WCAM is also fundamentally flexible with respect
to the legal claim at stake. Commensurate with the fact that
the application of the settlement parties to the court is
voluntary, there is no legal requirement as to the nature of
the claims being settled or that parties admit liability. In
Shell Petroleum, the original claims on behalf of the
worldwide plaintiffs, as well as plaintiffs purchasing shares
in U.S. transactions, were brought under U.S. securities law.
The non-U.S. plaintiffs were dismissed from the case on
account of insufficient conduct within the United States to
meet the standard of the conduct test.141 (Recall that the New
Jersey Federal Court’s 2007 decision is pre-Morrison.) The
Amsterdam Court however does not discuss any particular
theory of legal liability for the claims, and the settlement
expressly states that the Royal Dutch/Shell entities do not
admit liability.142 The WCAM settlement mechanism neither
requires a specific law as the basis for liability nor an
admission or determination of fault. It is important to note,
though, that in the settlement negotiations in the
Netherlands, the shareholder representatives had a crucial
point of leverage against the company that would be lacking
in some later cases: approval of the U.S. settlement, and
dismissal of the claim on the part of non-U.S. shareholders,
was contingent upon reaching the foreign settlement.143
The amount of the settlement is also noteworthy.
Shareholders
in
the
Dutch
settlement
received
approximately $359 million in total compensation, plus
attorneys’ costs of approximately $50 million.144 (In the
parallel
U.S.
settlement,
shareholders
received

141. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 724
(D.N.J. 2007).
142. See Mitchell A. Lowenthal et al., The Shell Settlement and the Dutch Act
on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Apr. 16, 2007).
143. See In re Royal Dutch/Shell, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 715; see also Henlser,
supra note 103, at 180.
144. See Hensler, supra note 103, at 181–82.
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approximately $80 million.145) The total loss in market
capitalization alleged by plaintiffs, and thus the total value
of the alleged claims of both U.S. and non-U.S. shareholders,
was $13.84 billion.146 While the Amsterdam court does not
explicitly discuss the total value of the claims against the
RDS entities, it does state that the settlement before it (of
$352 mil.) will provide between 9.79% and 12.46% of the
estimated damages, leading to a total non-U.S. claim in the
vicinity of $3.5 billion.147 Not only does the total amount of
both settlements put Shell Petroleum firmly in the category
of a “Mega Settlement,” it is significantly higher than the
typical median settlement (2–3%) as a percentage of
estimated damages.148 The fact that the U.S. settlement was
conditioned upon reaching a Dutch one likely played a
significant role in reaching such a high percentage.
2. Vedior
The Vedior settlement was the second securities
settlement brought under the WCAM.149 It was a small and
straightforward case. On November 30, 2007, Dutch multinational staffing firm Randstad agreed to acquire its
competitor Vedior.150 Vedior shares traded at 12.36 euros
when the market opened at 9 a.m. on November 30.151 As
rumors began to circulate concerning the deal, Vedior shares
climbed to 13.63 by 10:45 a.m. By the time the Netherlands

145. See id. at 185.
146. In re Royal Dutch/Shell, 380 F. Supp. 2d 509, 517 (D.N.J. 2005).
147. Shell Petroleum, ¶ 6.16.
148. See SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2016 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS,
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH (2016).
149. Hof’s-Amsterdam 15 juli 2009, JOR 2009, 325 m.nt. ACW Pijls [ECLI:NL:
GHAMS:2009:BJ2695BJ2691] (Randstad Holding) (Neth.) [hereinafter Vedior]
(translated by author).
150. See Reed Stevenson, Dutch Staffing Firm Randstad to Buy Rival Vedior,
REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2007), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vedior-randstad/
dutch-staffing-firm-randstad-to-buy-rival-vedior-idUSL0357707620071203.
151. See Vedior, at ¶ 2.3.
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Authority for the Financial Markets halted trading in Vedior
on the Euronext exchange at 11:34 a.m., the price had
reached 15.80. When trading resumed at 1:20 p.m., the price
was 15.80.152
The VEB and a stichting set up to pursue these claims
reached a settlement with Randstad, which had acquired
Vedior. The agreement provided that Randstad would offer
compensation to those who sold Vedior shares before the halt
of trading on the morning of November 30 amounting to 80%
of the difference between what they sold the shares at and
the re-opening price of 15.80.153 The total fund available for
Vedior shareholders who sold in that period came to 4.25
million euros.154 Vedior represents a straightforward failure
of disclosure and breaks no new ground as a WCAM
settlement.
3. Converium
Converium represents the next step in the evolution of
securities settlements under the WCAM. Like Royal
Dutch/Shell, it was a parallel litigation that began in U.S.
Federal court.155 Unlike its predecessor, however, the
connection to the Netherlands was much less obvious, as no
corporate entity and a mere 3.0% of the shareholders were
domiciled in the Netherlands. Converium is therefore
important because of the very broad interpretation of the
governing jurisdictional statutes the court offers in its
preliminary opinion in the case, which provide it with nearuniversal jurisdiction.156 The court’s second decision,
approving the final settlement, is also important on account
152. Id.
153. Id. at ¶ 2.6.
154. Id. at ¶ 4.18.
155. See In re Converium Holding AG Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 7897, 2006 WL
3804619 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2006).
156. Hof’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. JS Kortmann
[ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BO3908] (Scor Holding/Interim Decision) (Neth.)
[hereinafter Converium I] (translated by author).
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of its discussion and approval of a contingency fee. 157 The
20% contingency fee modelled on the American practice
represents an important advance for the synthetic class
action, because it allows attorneys to push forward these
cases with the hope of winning an award based on the size of
the final judgment.158
Converium was a Swiss reinsurance firm with its
common stock trading on the Swiss Stock Exchange and
ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange.159 In 2001, it was
spun off from its parent company, Zurich Financial Services,
in an IPO. Although Converium increased its reserves before
the IPO by a total of $112 million, earlier estimates
performed by actuarial consultants found that it was underreserved by $350 million.160 Its December 11, 2001 IPO was
the largest IPO ever of a reinsurer, with 35 million shares
sold for $1.76 billion. In the years to follow, however, its
financial woes continued. On July 20, 2004, it announced a
$400 million charge due to a required increase in its North
American unit’s reserves.161 This news led to an immediate
collapse in its stock price of nearly 50%. A number of
plaintiffs then brought class action lawsuits in U.S. Federal
court against Converium, Zurich Financial Services, and the
IPO underwriters UBS and Merrill Lynch. The lawsuits were
consolidated and assigned to the Southern District of New
York in 2006. After Judge Cote granted defendant’s motion
to dismiss the claims of non-U.S. investors under the pre-

157. Hof’s-Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, JOR 2012, 51 m.nt. BJ de Jong
[ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BV1026] (Scor Holding) (Neth.) [hereinafter Converium
II] (translated by author).
158. What amounts to a contingency fee was in fact paid to the law firm Grant
& Eisenhofer in Shell Petroleum, so this was not strictly speaking the first WCAM
securities settlement involving such a payment. See Hensler, supra note 2, at 318.
The Converium II judgment is important however for its explicit treatment and
blessing of a contingency fee to be paid to the non-Dutch attorneys.
159. See In re Converium Holding, 2006 WL 3804619 at *22.
160. See id. at *4.
161. See id. at *21.
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Morrison conduct test,162 a Dutch stichting was formed to
pursue a WCAM settlement.
In 2008, the American investors reached an $85 million
settlement with SCOR, the successor by merger to
Converium,
and
Zurich
Financial
Services.163
Representatives of the Dutch investors and SCOR reached
an agreement on the non-U.S. claims on July 8, 2010.164
When they petitioned the Amsterdam Court of Appeals to
declare the settlement binding, the court allowed them the
opportunity to first receive a provisional judgment
concerning the court’s jurisdiction in the case before the
interested parties, the shareholders, would be served notice
of a hearing on the substance of the petition.165 The
petitioners accepted this proposal, and on November 12,
2010 the court issued its first opinion.
The connection with the Netherlands was significantly
less than in Shell Petroleum. Converium was a Swiss
corporation that had merged into SCOR Holding AG, another
Swiss corporation. Prior to the merger, Converium shares
traded on the SWX exchange in Switzerland, with ADRs
trading on the New York Stock Exchange (the NYSE).
Furthermore, of the approximately 12,000 stockholders
excluded from the U.S. class action, only 200 were known to
be domiciled in the Netherlands.166 There were also
approximately 8,500 Swiss shareholders and 1,500
shareholders domiciled in the United Kingdom.167 The court

162. In re Scor Holding (Switzerland) AG Litigation, 537 F. Supp. 2d 556
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2008).
163. See Converium Holding Case 08/29/2008, SHAREHOLDERS FOUNDATION,
Aug. 29, 2008. (The total loss of Converium market capitalization on July 20,
2008 was approximately $1 billion, and by the first week of September
Converium shares had dropped to $8.86 from $25.02 six weeks earlier. See also
In re Converium Holding, 2006 WL 3804619, at *21–22.)
164. See Converium I, ¶ 1.
165. Id.
166. Id. at ¶ 2.3.
167. Id.
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was thus faced with the question of determining jurisdiction
over a non-Dutch petitioner, SCOR Holding, and the
shareholders or “interested parties” from the Netherlands,
elsewhere in the E.U., and outside the E.U.
The court begins its jurisdictional analysis by noting that
the proceedings before it are “a civil and commercial matter
as referred to in Article 1(1) of the EEX Regulation—the
Brussels I Regulation—and the EVEX Convention” (or the
Lugano Convention).168 Under Brussels I, Art. 5, jurisdiction
is proper “with the court of the place where the obligations
under the agreements are to be performed.”169 Since the
Dutch foundation (the Stichting Converium Securities
Compensation Foundation) will be responsible for
distributing the settlement amounts, this will occur in the
Netherlands. As for the interested parties whose rights will
be foreclosed by this settlement, jurisdiction is proper over
those shareholders domiciled in the Netherlands under
Article 2(1) of the Brussels I Regulation.170 For non-Dutch
shareholders domiciled in the European Union or a Lugano
convention state—most importantly Switzerland, but also
Iceland and Norway—jurisdiction is proper under Article 6,
preamble and (1), of Brussels I and the Lugano
Convention.171 The court emphasizes here that because the
settlement closes off other avenues of redress for parties who
don’t opt-out, “[t]here for this reason exists such a close
connection between these claims that the sound
administration of justice requires the claims to be
simultaneously heard and judged in order to avoid
incompatible court decisions in the event that the claims
were to be individually adjudicated.”172 Thus, just as in Shell
Petroleum, by referring to the “close connection” that is set

168. Id. at ¶ 2.7.
169. Id. at ¶ 2.8.
170. Id. at ¶ 2.10.
171. Id. at ¶ 2.11.
172. Id.
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forth in the Brussels I Regulation, Art. 6(1), the Amsterdam
Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of the
foundational principle of justice of that mandates treating
like cases alike.173
Finally, for shareholders not domiciled in the
Netherlands, the E.U., or in a Lugano Convention state,
jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Article 3 of the Dutch Code
of Civil Procedure (the “DCCP” or Wetboek van Burgerlijke
Rechtsvordering), preamble and sections (a) and (c), in
conjunction with DCCP Section 1013(3). This is because the
obligations of the parties to the petition are to be performed
in the Netherlands, and the involvement of the Foundation
“means the matter is sufficiently connected to the Dutch
legal order.” Through this expansive interpretation of the
relevant provisions of the regulations governing
international private law jurisdiction, as well as the Dutch
Code of Civil Procedure, the court finds jurisdiction in a case
where the responsible parties as well as the vast majority of
shareholders are located outside the Netherlands.174
The court’s discussion of the parallel litigation in the
Southern District of New York demonstrates that, in the
wake of Morrison, it understands its role as complementary

173. Brussels I, Art. 6(1) reads:
A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 1. Where he is
one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one
of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it
is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings . . . .
Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC), on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.
174. See Xandra E. Kramer, Enforcing Mass Settlements in the European
Judicial Area: EU Policy and the Strange Case of the Dutch Collective Settlements
(WCAM) in RESOLVING MASS DISPUTES: ADR AND SETTLEMENT OF MASS CLAIMS
79–82 (Christopher Hodges & Astrid Stadler, eds., 2013) (discussing the broad
assertion of worldwide jurisdiction on the part of the Converium court, and
concluding “[i]t is submitted that the way in which the Amsterdam Court
established its jurisdiction in Converium is not entirely convincing.”); see also
Collective Redress in the Netherlands, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform
(Feb. 6, 2012).
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to that of the U.S. court. The Dutch court notes that the
WCAM provides a means to give a binding settlement “for
the benefit of persons with respect to which the District
Court declined jurisdiction,” and so together the Dutch and
the American actions amount to “mutually complementing
settlements.”175
Converium’s other major legal advance is the court’s
explicit approval of an amount equal to 20% of the total
settlement ($58.4 x .2 = $11.68 million) to be paid to the
American counsel in the case.176 While the shareholders
objected to this amount, the court noted that it is appropriate
under Dutch law to consider what is appropriate and
reasonable in the United States.177 While the total amount of
the settlement here is much smaller than in its predecessor,
Shell Petroleum, the discussion and approval of an
American-style contingency award for the foreign lawyers
performing much of the work on the case is crucial because
it sets into place one of the key economic elements allowing
for the development of the “synthetic class action.”178
4. Fortis
The Fortis litigation arose out of an expensive, ill-fated
banking merger prior to the global financial crisis. The Fortis
settlement is important both for its massive size—at 1.2
billion euros, it is the largest ever in a securities case outside
the U.S.179—and the nuanced treatment the court offers of
its financial ramifications for different parties in the
agreement. Fortis demonstrates that the WCAM offers

175. Id. at ¶ 2.6.
176. Converium II, ¶ 6.5.1.
177. Converium II, ¶ 6.5.2.
178. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 190 (discussing financing structures of WCAM
actions).
179. Kevin La Croix, Dutch Court Declares Largest-Ever European Investor
Claims Settlement Binding, THE D&O DIARY (July 30, 2018), https://www.
dandodiary.com/2018/07/articles/international-d-o/dutch-court-declares-largestever-european-investor-claims-settlement-binding/.
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corporate defendants a valuable means of settling
shareholder litigation, as well as recognition of the benefits
and appropriateness of American-style contingency fee
awards in the international context.
Fortis N.V./S.A. was a Dutch/Belgian bank with its
customer base in the Benelux countries. The claims against
it grew out of its involvement in 2007 with the Royal Bank of
Scotland and Santander Bank in acquiring the assets of ABN
AMRO, a leading Dutch bank. The three financial
institutions paid 71.9 billion euros (U.S. $101 billion) for
ABN AMRO in October 2007 and then split its assets, with
Fortis taking those located in the Netherlands.180 When the
financial crisis struck a year later, Fortis’s assets were
already depleted from the acquisition at the same time that
it suffered substantial losses on structured finance securities
backed by U.S. mortgages. The value of its shares collapsed
from 22 euros in September 2007 to 1 euro in October
2008,181 and the Dutch government stepped in with a bailout
in October 2008.182
Shareholders filed a class action lawsuit in the Southern
District of New York in October 2008 alleging that Fortis
executives misstated the bank’s financial condition in 2007
and 2008 and misrepresented the value of its structured
finance assets. The U.S. lawsuit was dismissed in 2010 for
failing to meet the standards outlined in the conduct and
effects test.183 Lawyers representing various groups of
shareholders then pursued actions in Belgium and the

180. Bloomberg News, Consortium Wins Control of ABN Amro, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/09/business/worldbusiness/09
bank.html.
181. The plaintiffs argued for a class period in the U.S. case from September
17, 2007 to October 14, 2008. See Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 500
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
182. See Ingrid Melander & Niclas Mika, Netherlands Nationalizes Dutch
Fortis Units, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fortisbelgium/netherlands-nationalizes-dutch-fortis-units-idUSTRE49263E20081003.
183. See Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 502–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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Netherlands.184 (These lawsuits were not brought under the
WCAM, but DCCP 3:305 which allows for an opt-in mass
claim to determine liability.) The successor entity to Fortis,
Ageas S.A., agreed to a settlement with four shareholder
representatives in June 2017. When the parties petitioned
the Amsterdam Court of Appeals for approval, however, the
settlement was rejected.185 The court objected in particular
to the fact that the compensation scheme awarded
shareholders who had actively participated in bringing the
claim a substantially larger award (approximately 50%) than
non-participating shareholders. It also objected to the lack of
transparency concerning the fees that would be awarded to
the shareholder representatives.
The parties refashioned the settlement agreement and
petitioned the court once more. On July 13, 2018, the court
approved the 1.2 billion euro settlement.186 In addition to its
massive amount, it is important in its treatment of the
compensation awarded to both shareholders and the
organizations representing them. Unlike the first proposal,
the final settlement awards active and passive shareholders
compensation in equal measure. The court explained that the
intent behind the WCAM is to prevent parties experiencing
a loss from having to institute separate legal proceedings,
and that allowing separate recovery amounts would work
against this.187 Moreover, parties are entitled to “await the
outcome of a collective settlement” before deciding on
whether
to
institute
their
own
proceedings.188
Discrimination against passive claimants would hinder both
of these policies motivating the WCAM.

184. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1902 n.24.
185. Hof’s-Amsterdam 16 juni 2017, JOR 2018, 10 m.nt. Kortman (Ageas
S.A./N.V./[H]) (Neth.).
186. Hof’s-Amsterdam 13 juli 2018, JOR 2018, 246 m.nt. Tzankova (Ageas
S.A./N.V./[H]) (Neth.) [hereinafter Fortis] (translated by author).
187. Id. ¶ 5.1.3.
188. Id.
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On the other hand, the court allowed for an additional
25% compensation in the form of a “cost addition” to go to
active claimants.189 This amount is awarded to reimburse
these shareholders for the time and expense incurred in
bringing the claims to a resolution. Furthermore, a “success
fee” awarded to the shareholder representatives indirectly
allows the litigation funders and lawyers to be paid on a
contingency basis.190 As the court explains, claimants
registered with FortisEffect will pay a result-dependent fee
of 10% to FortisEffect; those registered with SICAF will pay
a 25% fee, and institutional investors with Deminor a 21%
fee (on average).191 Shareholders registered with VEB also
pay significant fees. The court explains that the fee
arrangements of the shareholder representatives involve
either significant risk on the part of the organization (in the
case of VEB and Deminor) or third-party funding in the case
of FortisEffect and SICAF. The additional compensation for
active claimants is deemed reasonable, and so acceptable
under WCAM.192 In addition to its record-breaking amount,
then, Fortis is important as it confirms the policy of the
Converium court to allow litigation funding on a contingency
basis, as long as any amounts paid are reasonable and do not
appear to detract from the amount paid to claimants. While
the court’s insistence on equal base compensation for passive
and active shareholders alike drew criticism from the
plaintiffs’ bar that it ignored the problem of “free-riding”
shareholders,193 it does allow for compensation of costs that
189. Id. ¶ 5.44.
190. See id. ¶¶ 5.1.4; 5.12; 5.15; 5.18–.21 (discussing the ramifications of the
success fee and its role in compensating the “interest organizations” (VEB,
Deminor, FortisEffect, and SICAF) which must compensate the litigation’s
funders).
191. See id. ¶ 5.15.
192. See id. ¶¶ 5.22, 5.30; Krans, supra note 89, at 292–94 (discussing the
court’s analysis regarding WCAM’s reasonableness, as required by Art. 7:907
para. 3.b. BW (Neth.)).
193. Alison Frankel, Dutch Court Approves $1.5 Billion Fortis Shareholder
Deal—But There’s A Catch, REUTERS (July 16, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/
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include significant contingent amounts.194
Where Fortis breaks new legal ground is in its use of a
two-step litigation strategy.195 This first involves obtaining a
declaratory judgment against the issuer under DCCP 3:305,
then using that judgment as leverage in negotiating a global
settlement under the WCAM. After the U.S. case against
Fortis was dismissed, various shareholder representatives
pursued judgments in the Belgian and Dutch courts.196 Since
there was substantial connection to the Netherlands because
Fortis and ABN/AMRO were Dutch banks, these claims
could not be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, as later
happened with British Petroleum. The actions filed in the
Belgian and Dutch courts thus operated to give the
shareholder representatives substantial leverage before the
case progressed to negotiations for a settlement to be brought
under the WCAM. The Fortis settlement is therefore
important due to its massive size, its approval of third-party
litigation funding structures compensating entrepreneurial
lawyers, and the preliminary use of DCCP 3:305 to compel
the issuer to reach a settlement.
5. Petrobras
While still ongoing, the Petrobras litigation is both
substantial—the parallel class litigation in the U.S. settled
article/us-otc-fortis/dutch-court-approves-1-5-billion-fortis-shareholder-deal-buttheres-a-catch-idUSKBN1K62OY.
194. See Tom Vos, Revised € 1,3 Billion Settlement in the Fortis Case Approved
by Dutch Court, CORPORATE FINANCE LAB (July 16, 2018), https://corporatefinance
lab.org/2018/07/16/revised-e13-billion-settlement-in-the-fortis-case-approved-bydutch-court/.
195. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1908; Franziska Weber & William H. van
Boom, Dutch Treat: The Dutch Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Act (WCAM
2005), 1 CONTRATTO E IMPRESA/EUROPE 69, 72 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1872363 (June 25, 2011) (discussing use of Art. 3:305 as a preliminary step
towards negotiations for a settlement under the WCAM); but see Tomas Arons &
Willem H. van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities
Claim Settlements from the Netherlands, EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 864–
865 (2010) (discussing the limitations of Art. 3:305).
196. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1902 n.24.
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for $2.95 billion in June 2018197—and legally important. The
securities fraud claims are based in the “Operação Lava
Jato” corruption scandal at Petrobras, the Brazilian oil
company. Petrobras executives were accused of participating
in rigged auctions for contracts with suppliers.198 When the
company paid inflated prices on construction projects and
acquisitions of property, 1–5% of the total price would be
transferred back to the executives. The executives, who were
appointed at the behest of the ruling coalition’s political
parties, also transferred funds to their respective parties.
When news of the scandal broke in 2014, the market
capitalization of Petrobras fell from $310 billion to $39 billion
and the price of ADRs on Petrobras common stock traded on
the NYSE fell by 80.92%.199
Plaintiffs filed five separate class action lawsuits in the
Southern District of New York alleging securities law
violations. These were consolidated in February 2015 and
assigned to Judge Jed Rakoff.200 In addition to the claims of
investors who purchased securities in transactions meeting
the Morrison criteria for admission to U.S. Federal court,
plaintiffs’ lawyers also brought claims of non-U.S. investors
under Brazilian law. Judge Rakoff dismissed the claims
relating to securities purchased on the Brazilian Bovespa, as
they were covered by Article 58 of Petrobras’s bylaws, which
contained a mandatory arbitration provision.201 He declined,
however, to dismiss the claims of plaintiffs purchasing
Petrobras securities on the NYSE.202 These purchasers

197. In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 317 F. Supp. 3d 858, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
198. See Jonathan Watts, Operation Car Wash: Is this the Biggest Corruption
Scandal in History?, THE GUARDIAN (June 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2017/jun/01/brazil-operation-car-wash-is-this-the-biggest-corruptionscandal-in-history.
199. See In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 3d 368, 373–75 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
200. Id. at 373.
201. Id. at 386–87.
202. Id. at 388–89.
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would not have consented to be bound by the arbitration
provision in the Company’s bylaws, which covered “disputes
. . . involving the Corporation, its shareholders, [and]
managers” arising from “the rules issued . . . by the Brazilian
Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores
Mobiliários – CVM) as well as in all further [rules applicable]
to the operation of the capital market in general.”203 As a
result, the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part
but denied in part. The claims of U.S. purchasers were
allowed to proceed, and a class was certified.204 These claims
settled in January 2018 for a whopping $2.95 billion, making
it the fifth-largest securities class action settlement in U.S.
history.205
After the claims of purchasers on the Bovespa were
dismissed, plaintiffs’ attorneys formed foundations in the
Netherlands to pursue claims there but with reportedly little
hope of success.206 Nevertheless, on September 19, 2018 their
efforts led to an important preliminary victory. The
Rotterdam District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction in a
collective action for a declaratory judgment under Article
3:305 of the Dutch Civil Code.207 Not surprisingly, the court
ruled that it had jurisdiction over the Petrobras entities
domiciled in the Netherlands, Petrobras Global Finance
B.V., Petrobras Oil & Gas B.V., and Petrobras International
Braspetro B.V.208 The court then determined that Article 7
203. Id. at 386.
204. In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 312 F.R.D. 354, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
205. Kevin LaCroix, Petrobras Settles U.S. Securities Suit Based on
Corruption-Related Allegations for $2.95 billion, THE D&O DIARY (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/01/articles/securities-litigation/petrobrassettles-u-s-securities-suit-based-corruption-related-allegations-2-95-billion/.
206. Kevin LaCroix, Dutch Court OKs Petrobras Claim Jurisdiction Despite
Brazilian Arbitration Clause, THE D&O DIARY (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.
dandodiary.com/2018/09/articles/international-d-o/dutch-court-oks-petrobrasclaim-jurisdiction-despite-brazilian-arbitration-clause/.
207. Rechtbank-Rotterdam 19 september 2018, TVA 2019, 10 (Petrobras)
(Neth.) [hereinafter Petrobras] (translated by author).
208. Id. ¶ 5.3.
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of the DCCP provided it with jurisdiction over Petrobras in
Brazil because some of the complaints “are so closely
connected as to justify a joint hearing for reasons of
efficiency, in order to prevent irreconcilable judgments from
being given in the event that the cases were heard and
determined separately.”209
The Rotterdam court also ruled that the arbitration
provision in the Petrobras bylaws did not preclude the Dutch
courts from hearing the claims of investors purchasing their
shares on the Bovespa. Contrary to Judge Rakoff, the
Rotterdam court determined that “this text of article 58
under Brazilian law does not satisfy the conditions to be
imposed on it and is not valid.”210 The argument in favor of
this interpretation turns on a rather fine point. The court
found that the English languge translation of the Petrobras
Articles of Association available on its website until 2014
stated that “Disputes or controversies involving the
Corporation, its shareholders, managers and members of the
Audit Board shall be resolved according to the rules of the
Market Arbitration Chamber . . . .”211 It did not however
explicitly state that any such disputes be resolved in
arbitration, as its revised translation later did: “It shall be
resolved by means of arbitration, obeying the rules provided
by the Market Arbitration Chamber . . . .”212 The court
therefore ruled that the original English-language text
available to investors on the Petrobras website “is the only
version which is of significance to the present issue on

209. Id. ¶ 5.13.
210. Id. ¶ 5.38. See LaCroix, supra note 206 (characterizing the ruling as “both
interesting and unexpected”); Daan Barbiers, Rotterdam District Court Rules on
Jurisdiction in Petrobras Collective Action, STIBBEBLOG (Dec. 17, 2018), https://
www.stibbe.com/en/news/2018/december/rotterdam-district-court-rules-on-juris
diction-in-petrobras-collective-action.
211. Petrobras, supra note 207, ¶ 2.2.
212. Id. ¶ 5.29 (quoting Article 58 of Petrobras’ bylaws) (emphasis added by
court).
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jurisdiction.”213 Since Brazilian law provides that access to
the national courts is a fundamental right, the court held
that the text should clearly and specifically state that any
disputes must not be put before the national court, but before
an arbitral tribunal.214 Since the English language
translation of Article 58 failed to do so, the court ruled that
Article 58 was invalid under Brazilian law.215
With this determination, the proceedings against
Petrobras were allowed to continue. To be sure, these are
preliminary actions that can only result in a determination
of liability, not a monetary judgment. Such a proceeding,
however, can be an important precursor to pursuing a
settlement against corporate defendants. While the U.S.
Petrobras settlement is noteworthy for its massive size, so
far the Dutch proceeding is noteworthy for its disregard of an
arbitration provision that the U.S. court upheld.
6. Failed Settlements and the Limits of the WCAM:
British Petroleum and Rabobank
In addition to the settlements reviewed above, and the
ongoing Petrobras action, two failed attempts to reach a
settlement are important. For shareholders and their legal
representatives they stand as warnings, demonstrating the
limits of the WCAM. When initial settlement negotiations
fail, the foundation backing the claims is forced to apply to
the Dutch courts for a declaratory judgment under DCC
3:305. This provision was added to the Dutch Civil Code in
1994 and allows a foundation or association to obtain a
classwide determination of liability against a corporation.216
A DCC 3:305 action does not allow for a classwide monetary
judgment, however, nor does it have res judicata effect in

213. Id. ¶ 5.33.
214. Id. ¶ 5.37.
215. Id. ¶ 5.38.
216. See van Boom, supra note 98, at 175–77.
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further proceedings by individual parties.217 Nevertheless,
its statement of liability can be valuable to shareholders and
a DCC 3:305 action is often used as a first step in the WCAM
settlement process.218 For shareholders forced to travel this
route, though, these two recent cases demonstrate its
pitfalls.
The British Petroleum (BP) case concerns losses relating
to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster and associated
disclosure both before and after the oil spill on the part of BP.
In June 2016, BP agreed to pay $175 million to settle claims
in a U.S Federal class action lawsuit.219 In their attempted
parallel claim in the Netherlands, non-U.S. shareholders
could not reach an agreement with BP. When the
negotiations failed, VEB turned to the Amsterdam District
Court, seeking a declaration under DCC 3:305(a) that would
establish BP’s liability. Such a declaration would then lend
support to the claims of individual shareholders in court
(although causality in each individual claim would still need
to be established), or more likely, reopen settlement
negotiations with an eye to bringing an agreed upon
settlement before the Amsterdam Court of Appeals.
In September 2016, the Amsterdam District Court ruled
that it lacked jurisdiction in the case.220 Under European
Union law, as explained in Universal Music in 2016 , tort
actions must be brought in the Member State where either

217. Id. at 177.
218. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1908.
219. New Class Claims Administrator’s Proposed Distribution Model for the
Combined Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. and Transocean Ltd. Settlements
Fund, In Re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico,
No. 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2016).
220. Rechtbank-Amsterdam 28 september 2016, JOR 2017, 37 m.nt. WellingSteffens (V.E.B./B.P. P.L.C.) (Neth.); Kevin LaCroix, Dutch Court Dismisses
Collective Investor Action against BP on Jurisdictional Grounds, THE D&O DIARY
(Oct. 13 2016), https://www.dandodiary.com/2016/10/articles/international-do/dutch-court-dismisses-collective-investor-action-bp-jurisdictional-grounds/.
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the defendant is domiciled or the harmful event occurred.221
The location of a harmful event is furthermore subdivided
into two categories: either the location of the event giving rise
to the damages (the Handlungsort), or the place where the
initial damages occurred (the Erfolgsort).222 Since the oil spill
at the center of the BP litigation occurred in the Gulf of
Mexico, VEB argued that the damages occurred in the
Netherlands, since the securities accounts of Dutch
shareholders were located there. Relying on the European
Court of Justice’s Universal Music decision, the Amsterdam
District Court determined that the location of a securities
account alone, without other factors connecting it to the
event, was insufficient to establish jurisdiction.
British Petroleum thus illustrates the secondary line of
defense available to a corporation accused of wrongdoing.
Because the jurisdictional requirements for parties bringing
an action under DCC 3:305(a) are much more restrictive
than those at play in approving a settlement under the
WCAM, plaintiffs are deprived of an important point of
leverage when settlement negotiations fail. When compared
to the American class action context Article 3:305 reinforces
the general position of strength of a putative defendant (in
the American sense) under the WCAM. The corporation is
free to walk away from settlement negotiations that, from its
perspective at least, do not appear to be leading to a
beneficial outcome.
While not a securities case, the Rabobank litigation
illustrates a different pitfall for shareholders and their
lawyers. In 2015, a foundation formed by Dutch attorney
Pieter Lijesen filed a collective action under DCC 3:305 on
behalf of its members against Rabobank.223 The claim was
221. Case C-12/15, Universal Music Int’l Holding B.V., 2016 E.C.R.; Roos
Elemans, Universal Music: Locating Purely Financial Damage, STIBBEBLOG (July
26, 2016), www.stibbeblog.nl/all-blog-posts/commercial-litigation/universal-mus
ic-locating -purely-financial-damage.
222. Universal Music Int’l Holding B.V., 2016 E.C.R. ¶¶ 20–22.
223. See Kevin C. Mortimer & Joel D. Rothman, Dutch Foundation Dismissed
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based on alleged insufficient disclosure of the risks
associated with interest rate swaps sold from 2005 to 2011
by Rabobank. Over 8,000 swaps were sold to enterprises that
wanted to hedge against interest rate risk on floating rate
loans. The Foundation claimed that in addition to engaging
in manipulation of the EURIBOR and LIBOR rates,
Rabobank failed to meet its duty of care in properly
informing customers of the risks associated with the swaps.
Rabobank successfully argued that the Foundation did
not sufficiently protect the interests of the parties for whom
the claim was filed.224 Until December 2015, when Rabobank
objected in its reply to the Foundation’s original claim,
Attorney Lijesen was the only director of the Foundation and
there was no supervisory board.225 Furthermore, the
Foundation was set up solely to pursue these claims, and
Lijesen appeared to be in the business of setting up claims
foundations to pursue like cases. The court determined that
the structure of the Foundation was insufficient to protect
the claims of the enterprises for which it was ostensibly
acting. Furthermore, the various claims were improperly
bundled together under 3:305(a). Not only did the various
swaps differ in important ways, the individual circumstances
leading to an alleged violation of the duty of care were
sufficiently different to render a bundled claim improper.
The court thus declared the Foundation’s claim inadmissible
under DCP 3:305(a).226
Rabobank and British Petroleum thus illustrate that
when shareholders attempt to pursue a declaration of
liability on a class-wide basis, their claims can fail due to
insufficient contact with the Netherlands, a Foundation that
for Inadequate Safeguarding of Members’ Interests, MINTZ INSIGHTS (July 14,
2016), https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2451/2016-07-dutchfoundation-dismissed-inadequate-safeguarding-members.
224. Rechtbank-East Brabant, 29 june 2016, JOR 2016, 278 m.nt. Lemstra
(Foundation of Interest Flash Claim/Cooperative Rabobank U.A.)(Neth.), ¶ 5.22.
225. Id. ¶ 5.24.
226. Id. ¶ 5.56.
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does not adequately safeguard the interests of its purported
beneficiaries, or what American lawyers would think of as a
lack of commonality of claims. While these pitfalls are not
within the WCAM itself, they are obstacles that a foundation
or association will face when it seeks a determination of
liability as a preliminary step to entering into settlement
negotiations. Without such a determination, particularly
where the defendant does not face obvious and certain
liabilities, or at least legal costs, settlement negotiations may
be inconclusive. These cases therefore illustrate a secondline threat to the viability of a WCAM action.227

227. See Joel D. Rothman, Viability of Dutch Claims Foundations in Question,
MINTZ INSIGHTS (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/
viewpoints/2451/2017-01-viability-dutch-claims-foundations-question.
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III. IN COMPARISON: THE WCAM AND THE AMERICAN
SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION
Since its enactment in 2005, a handful of securities cases
have come under the WCAM: four settlements, one ongoing
major action, and at least one failed attempt at a settlement
in a major case. During the same period, over 2,000 “core”
securities class actions (excluding M&A-related actions)
have come before the U.S. federal courts.228 Despite the small
number of cases on the Dutch side, it is possible to draw some
lines of comparison. The vast disparity in numbers points to
the most important difference. Since it does not offer
shareholders a cause of action but merely a settlement
mechanism, only the very strongest claims are likely to lead
to settlement under the WCAM. Beneath this crucial
difference, however, are some crucial similarities. Most
importantly, the familiar criticisms of the American
securities fraud class action on account of its circularity and
questionable deterrent effect also apply to the Dutch regime.
This combination of similarity and difference leads to a
mixed appraisal of the WCAM. Since it does not provide a
basis to determine liability and damages in a mass claim, the
WCAM leads to a radical reduction in the amount of
securities cases brought before the courts. For the harsher
critics of the American system, this result in itself will likely
be something to cheer. On the other hand, since the
settlements under the WCAM replicate the core problems
with the American class action, the Dutch system fails as a
more sophisticated advance over the American one. This
failure points towards some final political-economic
reflections. The emergence of the WCAM as an alternative to
the American courts was a result of a confluence of factors.
Jurisprudential considerations on the part of the American
and Dutch courts, the economic benefits of a global
settlement to multi-national corporations, and the
228. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2018
YEAR IN REVIEW 41 (2018).

536

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

unintended application of the WCAM statute to securities
cases have all played causal roles. Law, economics, and
serendipity all figure into the development of the global
synthetic securities class action.
A. Altering the Balance of Power
The most important difference between the WCAM and
the American securities fraud class action concerns the
bargaining power of defendants (here used in the American
sense) in the respective systems. Since the Dutch WCAM
does not offer a cause of action but only a mechanism for all
parties to petition the court to give binding effect to a
settlement already agreed upon, the WCAM shifts power
decisively to the corporation who would be the defendant in
an American class action.229
Under the WCAM, a corporation faces no immediate
threat that it will lose a litigation on the merits because the
WCAM does not offer a means to determine liability. Any
threat to the corporation is therefore substantially more
remote. It may have to defend against individual claims, but
it is always free to walk away if it does not feel further
negotiations will lead to what it perceives to be an
advantageous resolution of the possible claims at stake.230
(The British Petroleum case reviewed above appears to
represent such a situation.231) The only real consequence to
walking away will be that the company remains open to
multiple individual claims.232 Depending on the ability of
individual plaintiffs to bring such claims, and the liability
the company might face under the law of the various
shareholder jurisdictions, this is often a risk a corporation is
willing to run.
229. See COFFEE, supra note 106, at 216–18.
230. See Krans, supra note 89, at 287–89 (discussing incentives in settlement
negotiations); Coffee, supra note 2, at 1906.
231. See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text.
232. See Arons & van Boom, supra note 195, at 868.
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From the point of view of the corporate defendant, then,
the negotiation process before a WCAM settlement can be
considered a form of non-binding alternative dispute
resolution.233 It allows for a settlement to be given
conclusive, and preclusive, effect, but imposes no
consequences if the corporation leaves the table. As
compared to settlement talks before trial in an American
securities fraud class action, the defendant here has the
favorable position, with no immediate downside to rejecting
a deal not perceived to be to its advantage. It is interesting
to compare the WCAM statute to the proposal for
replacement of securities fraud class actions by arbitration
presented by Hal Scott and Leslie Silverman.234 They
propose allowing corporations to adopt bylaw amendments
which would replace the classwide securities fraud class
action with binding arbitration. Their proposal differs from
the WCAM in that it provides for binding, not non-binding,
arbitration, and it also mandates individual, not class-wide
or consolidated arbitration. The WCAM does not go as far as
the Scott and Silverman proposal in shifting power to the
defendant, because WCAM settlement talks are entered into
by representatives of many, if not most, of a company’s
shareholders, but the binding nature of their arbitration
proposal would force a defendant to live with an adverse
decision.
Given that the balance of power in a WCAM negotiation
greatly favors the corporation allegedly causing harm, what
could induce it to settle? Recall that in Shell Petroleum,

233. See Kramer, supra note 174, at 63–74 (analyzing the WCAM as a variety
of ADR).
234. Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory
Individual Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187
(2013). Other commentators also have proposed modifying the ability of
shareholders to maintain a private class action. See John C. Coffee, No Exit?
Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of
Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988); A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action
Reform, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217 (2007–2008).
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settlement of the parallel action in U.S. federal court was
conditioned upon reaching a settlement of the global claims
outside the United States.235 In Converium, non-U.S
shareholders had been dismissed from the U.S. action but
were able to press their claim in negotiations with the new
parent company SCOR.236 And in Fortis, shareholder
representatives successfully pressed individual actions
under DCCP 3:305 as a preliminary to a WCAM
settlement.237 In all these cases a settlement under the
WCAM offered the corporation the prospect of a final
resolution to the dispute. Because a judgment approved by
the Amsterdam Court of Appeals will be enforced throughout
Europe through the Brussels regulation on the enforceability
of judgments, the main benefit offered to an alleged corporate
wrongdoer by the WCAM mechanism is the prospect of
finality.238
As a consequence of the balance of power between
shareholders and corporations under the WCAM, only the
strongest cases are likely to result in a settlement. If a claim
is weak due to either the facts or the law in non-U.S.
jurisdictions, the benefits to a corporation are likely to be too
small for a settlement to offer an attractive means of
resolving a case.239 This shift in the balance of power in turn
explains the vast difference in the number of American
securities litigations and WCAM settlements. For many
critics of the American securities class action this will be
something to cheer. The WCAM does not give would-be
plaintiffs the ability to launch in terrorem litigation designed
to force a settlement, but it does offer defendants an avenue

235. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text.
238. See Arons & van Boom, supra note 195, at 865–68; Kaal & Painter, supra
note 83, at 167.
239. See Weber & van Boom, supra note 195, at 73 (detailing incentives for
defendants to settle); Arons & van Boom, supra note 195, at 868.
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to a global settlement where the price is right.240 While it
allows lawyers to create a synthetic class action, the WCAM
does not open the floodgates to vexatious litigation. For those
who see at least some value in the American system, though,
the WCAM may be viewed with caution.241
B. The Problems of Circularity and Deterrence
Beneath this overarching difference, similarities
between the Dutch and the American systems emerge. Most
importantly, the problems surrounding the justification of
the American securities class action that have been the
subject of extensive discussion over recent decades are
replicated under the WCAM. Because the payments to
shareholders and their representatives come from the
companies themselves, the problem of circularity is present
in the Dutch settlements. And just as in the American
context, the nature of the deterrent effect a settlement may
have on corporate executives is unclear. While the WCAM
greatly reduces the total incidence of claims against
corporations, it fails to offer any improvement on the two
most important questions concerning the economic efficacy
as well as the justice of the American securities class action.
Circularity is the lynchpin of the economic critique of the
securities fraud class action. It stems from the realization
that, unlike in other types of class actions, any recovery to
shareholders who have been harmed by corporate
misrepresentations or fraud is ultimately funded by the
shareholders themselves.242 In this general sense, then, a
securities class action represents a circular flow of money
240. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 83, at 167.
241. See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 106, at 216–17; see also Hensler, supra note
2, at 312.
242. See Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities
Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 337; John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556 (2006); James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class
Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 509 (1997).
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from one group of shareholders to another, with lawyers for
the plaintiffs taking a significant cut in the form of a
contingency fee.243 Defense counsel are paid for by the
shareholders as well. Despite this circularity, a securities
class action can result in meaningful compensation for
certain shareholder groups.244 When shareholders who
purchased at prices inflated by fraud are compensated for the
difference in the price they purchased at and the “true value”
of the shares, they are made whole. Nevertheless, unlike in
other types of mass actions, the unique structure of the
securities fraud class action means that the flow of funds is
fundamentally circular, in that it runs from one group of
shareholders to another.245
The phenomenon of circularity has both economic and
moral aspects. Economically, circularity should be seen as a
reduction in the efficiency of the compensatory function of
the securities fraud class action rather than its complete
negation.246 From the point of view of shareholders who have
exited their investments, complete compensation is in
principle possible. Nevertheless there is always some
circularity in the sense that the amounts paid ultimately
come from the shareholders themselves (barring the unusual
case where decisionmakers are forced to pay personally). And
even if direct compensation and legal costs are paid by
insurance, it is the shareholders who pay the premiums on
the insurance policies. The irreducible economic aspect of

243. See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked,
Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the
Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 635
(2007) (stating that legal costs account for approximately 50% of the cost of the
securities class action remedy).
244. See James Cameron Spindler, We Have a Consensus on Fraud on the
Market—And It’s Wrong, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 67, 92–93 (2017) (explaining that
in certain circumstances, defrauded shareholders can be made whole).
245. See Coffee, supra note 242, at 1561–62 (contrasting enterprise liability in
a mass tort case with securities fraud).
246. See Spindler, supra note 244, at 86–87 (citing Cox, supra note 242, at 509–
10).
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circularity is that amounts paid in compensation and legal
fees are ultimately paid for by shareholders.
The fact that the shareholders paying compensation and
legal bills are innocent of any wrongdoing gives the problem
of circularity a moral sting. In the typical mass tort case, for
example, the shareholders of a corporation that pays a
judgment to the victims of its actions have indirectly
benefitted from the tortious act because the company would
have made money from selling an unsafe product or
manufacturing products in violation of environmental
regulations, for example. In a securities fraud mass action,
however, those funding the recovery—the present
shareholders of the company, who either retained their
shares or purchased them after an incident of securities
fraud—cannot be said to be beneficiaries of any
wrongdoing.247 It is typically the executives who have
benefitted, for example by earning large bonuses because the
company’s stock price was kept artifically high, not the
shareholders who have continued to hold their stock in the
company. Morally, the shareholders who retain their stock
are as blameless as those shareholders being compensated,
with the only difference that those receiving compensation
happened to buy or sell their corporate shares during the
class period.248 Adding to the problem of innocent
shareholders funding securities fraud recoveries is the makeup of the different classes of shareholders. A large portion of
the shareholders who receive compensation will be shortterm traders such as hedge funds, while buy and hold
investors are often less sophisticated “Main Street”
investors.249 This adds a political dimension to the perceived

247. See Coffee, supra note 242, at 1562.
248. See Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When
Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 297, 309 (arguing that fairness
concerns do not justify compensating diversified investors because to do so would
be unfair to undiversified ones).
249. See Coffee, supra note 242, at 1559–60.
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moral injury of a circular shareholder recovery.250
Circularity has been the heart of the critique of the
American securities class action, and commentators such as
Fox who accept the deterrence rationale often conclude that
the compensatory rationale is weak.251 Turning to the
WCAM, it is not surprising that it offers no improvement on
the American securities class action as far as the
compensatory rationale is concerned. Its origins as a
mechanism to enable mass settlement of more traditional
tort claims means that it fails to deal with the problem of
circularity. The WCAM settlement is therefore open to the
same critique as its American counterpart. While it may be
too much to expect that the legislature or judges in a foreign
jurisdiction such as the Netherlands thoroughly investigate
the possible problems in applying a mass claims statute to a
type of case it was not originally designed for, the WCAM
securities settlements replicate the circularity inherent in
their American counterparts.
Deterrence is the other main justification for the
securities class action. The threat of a lawsuit, the argument
goes, will have a deterrent effect that incentivizes accurate
statements and disclosure on the part of the company and its
executives. While it is hard to measure the deterrent effect
of such a threat, if real it presents a solid justification for the
present system.252 Unfortunately, just as with the
compensation rationale, even if in theory there is a deterrent
effect, a number of factors serve to weaken its force in
practice. Most importantly, the actors whose statements give

250. See COFFEE, supra note 106, at 145–46 (“It is hard to imagine a set of rules
that would be less politically acceptable (if they were understood) than a system
that involuntarily transfers money from ordinary citizens to hedge funds.”).
251. See Fox, supra note 248; see also Langevoort, supra note 243, at 635–36.
252. See generally Fox, supra note 248; Coffee, supra note 242; see also Fisch,
supra note 242 (proposing a corporate governance rationale justifying the threat
of the securities fraud class action). But see Richard Booth, The Future of
Securities Litigation, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 129, 148–49 (2009) (questioning the
deterrence rationale).
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rise to a securities class action are typically insulated from
any personal liability for their misstatements.253 Under the
terms of an insurance policy covering such a settlement it is
important that the corporate executives not admit
intentional or even reckless wrongdoing.254 A recovery for the
plaintiffs then requires that the executives responsible for a
misstatement not admit to any wrongful conduct. The
structural imperative that decisionmakers not assume
personal responsibility thus directly cuts against the
possibility of a securities class action actually having a
deterrent effect. Plaintiffs’ lawyers will not be able to recover
in most securities class action lawsuits if they pursue a claim
resulting in personal liability.
The Dutch securities settlements concluded so far are
unsurprisingly devoid of any discussion of the deterrent
effect to be had from the threat of a securities fraud claim.
First, the focus of the WCAM is on compensation of victims
and the corresponding benefit of finality that a settlement
brings to the alleged wrongdoer.255 Second, because the
WCAM does not involve a cause of action, there is no direct
threat against a would-be wrongdoer, only the benefit of a
possible settlement. While the arguments for a deterrence
rationale in the American context should hold good in the
Dutch context,256 they are rather far removed from the
practicalities of the individual settlements thus far
253. See Langevoort, supra note 243, at 640–46 (proposing the use of equitable
actions to recoup ill-gotten gains from fraud on the part of corporate executives);
Coffee, supra note 242, at 1570 (explaining how insurance coverage of directors
and officers deprives class actions lawsuits of their deterrent effect).
254. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 1465, 1469 (2004).
255. See Arons & van Boom, supra note 195, at 868 (“[I]t is clear that the
settlement aims primarily at financial compensation for injured
individuals. . . .”).
256. See Kramer, supra note 174, at 64 (noting the deterrence rationale in the
European context); see also U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE GROWTH
OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN THE EU: A SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN 10 MEMBER
STATES 50 (2017) (arguing against a deterrence motive for collective actions in
Europe).
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concluded under the WCAM.
C. Lawyers’ Incentives
A strong line of criticism of the American securities class
action concerns the structural incentives it creates for
lawyers, particularly those representing the plaintiffs. In
short, the criticism is that the American system of lawyerdriven mass actions incentivizes lawyers to work for their
own interests, not those of their clients.257 It also incentivizes
nuisance claims or “strike suits,” where claims are filed in
weak cases simply to extract a settlement out of the
defendants. Given that there is substantial evidence to
support at least some version of these criticisms, do the same
problems arise under the WCAM? What incentives do
lawyers have here, and how are shareholders’ interests
protected? Furthermore, can the WCAM mechanism lead to
a “race to the bottom” where competing shareholder
representatives can engage in a reverse auction to settle the
claims at the lowest possible cost to the defendant?
Like other European jurisdictions, the ban on
contingency-fee lawyering in the Netherlands prevents
lawyers from receiving a fee based on their success in
resolving the claim.258 Nevertheless, the securities cases
resolved under the WCAM are funded by third-party
litigation funders, often hedge funds, and the settlement
amounts paid to the claimant representative organizations
include a “success fee,” so in practice they do represent a type
of contingency-fee lawyering. To work around the Dutch
rules governing legal practice and the potential imposition of
“loser-pays” fee shifting, a complex funding structure is

257. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’
Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19–27 (1991). But see COFFEE,
supra note 2, at 91–94.
258. See Tjeenk & van Heeswijk, supra note 91, at 136.
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used.259 First, the Dutch attorneys working on the case are
paid their standard hourly rate, as required by Dutch rules
governing the practice of law. The claimant organizations
such as VEB, Deminor, and the various stichtings involved
in each case enter into funding agreements with third-party
litigation funders. The funder covers the upfront costs of the
litigation in exchange for a large slice (estimated at 40–50%)
of the settlement if successful.260 Crucially, a claimant
organization also purchases an insurance policy protecting it
against the imposition of litigation costs in a “loser-pays”
system in case the claim is unsuccessful.261 This structure
provides for the essential work-around of the Dutch rules
against contingency-fee lawyering thereby allowing for
something like an American class action lawsuit. The
Amsterdam Court of Appeals has specifically blessed this,
noting that the use of third-party litigation funding in these
cases enables them to go forward and is therefore justified on
public policy grounds.262
Given this structure, the incentives of lawyers in the
Dutch actions in the end approximate those in the American
system. While the rules against contingency fees insulate the
Dutch attorneys from the specific incentives governing their
American counterparts, since they are paid their standard
hourly rate, entrepreneurial American law firms such as
Grant & Eisenhofer have played an important role in these
cases as well. Since their compensation is determined by
their success or failure in achieving a settlement for their
clients, they will be subject to similar incentives as in their
cases in the U.S. Indeed, a look at the details of the three

259. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1904–05; Hensler, supra note 2, at 318–19.
260. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1904; see also U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, supra note 256, at 29–32.
261. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1904.
262. See Fortis, supra note 186, ¶ 5.1.4 (“More generally, the Court has
explicitly acknowledged that collective proceedings can be expensive and that it
is of social importance that collective proceedings can be conducted, so that
financing should be found for them.”).
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most important WCAM settlement cases shows similar
results as in American securities fraud class actions. These
results have two different implications for fears that the
WCAM mechanism may facilitate a “race to the bottom” of
competing plaintiffs’ attorneys. Within the Dutch system
itself there are substantial safeguards protecting against a
race to the bottom, including both the oversight of the courts
and economic factors surrounding the representation of
shareholders. On an international basis, however, there is
the possibility that defendants can use a Dutch settlement to
undermine a settlement more advantageous to shareholders
in another jurisdiction. (Indeed, in Shell Petroleum this
arguably occurred.)
A look at the fee amounts in the major Dutch settlements
is instructive. In Shell Petroleum, lawyers handling both the
U.S. claims and the foreign claims dismissed under the thenprevailing conduct test received separate fee awards. The
Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshitz firm received a fee award of
$30 million for its work in the U.S. case, which had total
damages of approximately $89 million that RDS paid to
settle the U.S. claims.263 They also negotiated a fee of $27
million with RDS for their work on the global claims prior to
their dismissal, which the court approved.264 In the global
case settled under the WCAM, Grant & Eisenhofer received
a fee of approximately $50 million. Such an amount comes to
a total of $107 million in legal fees on total awards in both
cases of $471 million. If the legal fees are added to the total
award, coming to a figure of $578 million, legal fees would
comprise 18.5% of the total amount.265
Such amounts are on the high side for American
securities class action settlements in this range, but not

263. See Hensler, supra note 103, at 186.
264. Id. at 187.
265. Note that the fee amounts going to law firms are in addition to (not a
percentage taken out of) the compensation given to shareholders. See Hensler,
supra note 2, at 318.
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outside the realm of the ordinary.266 Aside from the fee
amounts, however, there is another aspect to the case which
Professors Coffee and Hensler each explore.267 Through its
representation of major institutional investors, Grant &
Eisenhofer essentially intervened in the U.S. case by opening
negotiations for a global non-U.S. settlement with Royal
Dutch/Shell. This intervention likely led to lower total costs
to RDS, and, at least in Professor Coffee’s estimation, raises
the prospect of a race to the bottom on the international
level.268 In this precedent-setting case, where the U.S.
settlement was conditioned upon the global non-U.S.
settlement in the Netherlands, this fear is justified.
Nevertheless, RDS shareholders received a total of $471
million. Relying on the testimony of expert witnesses Allen
Ferrell and Michael Perino that its fee award comprises
between 9.79% and 12.46% of the estimated damages for
non-U.S. plaintiffs, the Dutch court characterizes this as a
reasonable and even generous award.269 Compared to the
average award in an American securities class action, this
judgment is undoubtedly correct.270
Converium likewise involves ordinary fee awards in both
the U.S. and the Dutch actions. In the U.S. case, plaintiffs’

266. Eisenberg, Miller & Germano report that the mean fee percentage in
securities class actions lawsuits in [U.S. federal court] from 2009 to 2013 is 23%,
and the median award is 25%. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & Roy
Germano, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions: 2009-2013, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 952
(2017) (Table 4. Fee and Class Recoveries, by Case Category, 2009–2013). Since
the average fee as a percentage of the class action award declines as the size of
the award increases, however, these fee amounts may be high. See Hensler, supra
note 103, at 186–87 (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Attorneys’ Fees
and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
248 (2010)).
267. See Coffee, supra note 106, at 217; Hensler, supra note 2, at 314–19; see
also Clopton supra note 65, at 146.
268. See Coffee supra note 106, at 217.
269. See Shell Petroleum, supra note 131, ¶ 6.15.
270. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS:
2016 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 7 (2016) (finding median settlements as a percentage
of estimated damages in 2016 of 2.5%).
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attorneys were awarded 20% (plus $4.5 mil. of litigation
expenses) of the total award of $84.6 million.271 In the Dutch
settlement, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals likewise
approved a total settlement of $58.4 million, with 20% of that
amount going to the Principal Counsel, the trio of U.S. law
firms handling the American litigation and assisting in the
Dutch litigation.272 Converium is noteworthy for its explicit
discussion of this contingency fee award. The court rejects
the argument made by certain shareholder representatives
that such an amount is excessive. It notes that much of the
work was in fact performed in the U.S. by Principal Counsel,
and declares that under Dutch law “it is possible to take
account of that which is customary in the U.S. and is seen as
reasonable.”273 Also important is the Converium court’s
discussion of the discrepancy in per share awards between
the U.S. action and the Dutch one. The court acknowledges
this, but finds that it reflects the fact that “the legal position
of the non-U.S. exchange purchasers is substantially
different from that of the U.S. exchange purchasers.”274
The fees in the Fortis case also come to about the same
amount, although in a significantly more complex context, as
the four shareholder representatives—VEB, Deminor,
FortisEffect, and SICAF—received varying amounts. The
court rejected the first proposed settlement in part because
of lack of transparency concerning fees, and also because the
“active claimants” who had joined a shareholder
representative group (and paid fees up front) would have
received around 50% greater compensation amounts than
the passive ones.275 The second settlement, which the court
approved, paid shareholders the same amounts, plus a “cost

271. See Order Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, In re SCOR Holding
(Switzerland) A.G. Litig., (S.D.N.Y.) (Dec. 17, 2008) (No. 04-7897).
272. See Converium II, supra note 157, ¶ 6.5.3.
273. Id. ¶ 6.5.2.
274. Id. ¶ 6.4.2.
275. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text.
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addition” to account for costs incurred by the active
shareholders. The second settlement also approves of fees
from Ageas (the successor to Fortis) totalling 45 mil. euros,
“success fees” of approximately 83.5 mil. euros, and costs of
29.6 mil. euros.276 In addition to this, FortisEffect members
pay a fee of 10%, SICAF members 25%, and Deminor
members 21%.277 VEB is non-profit. Given these numbers, a
ballpark figure of 20% fees paid to representative
organizations, their attorneys, and third-party litigation
funders seems likely. This number in fact appears quite high
for a case of this size, with a settlement value of $1.5
billion.278
The cost of these settlements to shareholders is on the
high side then, particularly for Fortis shareholders.
Nevertheless, the recovery and fee amounts do not appear
outside the range of reasonable settlements (with the
exception of Fortis). This suggests that within the context of
the Netherlands, the WCAM is not leading to a “race to the
bottom” on the part of competing representative
organizations and their lawyers. The structure of the WCAM
in fact appears to prevent this, because any representative
organization or injured party can have a seat at the table and
voice its opinion on a proposed settlement even if it has not
been involved in settlement negotiations.279 While there may
be grounds to suspect that the representative organizations
are charging high fees for their services, as the Fortis court
suggests, within the Netherlands itself the structure of the
WCAM settlement process does not appear to simply allow
for one organization to cut a deal at the lowest cost with a
defendant and then have that declared binding on all
claimants.

276. See Fortis, supra note 186, ¶¶ 5.14–.15; see also Vos, supra note 194.
277. Fortis, supra note 186, ¶¶ 5.36–.38.
278. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 266, at 265 (reporting a mean fee
award of 12% for awards greater than 175.5 million).
279. See van Boom, supra note 98, at 182.
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In addition to the procedural protection afforded to
interested parties is the active role the WCAM gives to the
Amsterdam Court of Appeals. Most important is the
requirement under DCC 907(3) that the court find a
settlement “reasonable.”280 While this term can mean
different things to different parties, all the WCAM
settlements so far find the court taking this requirement
seriously.281 This reflects the position of the drafters of the
statute that the court would play an active role to protect the
interests of claimants. The open-ended nature of the term
“reasonable” also allows for the court to factor in a broad
range of considerations here, including the standard practice
in American courts where contingency-fee lawyering in class
actions prevails.
On the whole, the interests of lawyers in the WCAM
settlements roughly approximate those of lawyers in
American securities class actions. While the Dutch lawyers
are insulated from the pressures American attorneys have to
settle cases, at times in conflict with their clients’ interests,
the American firms involved in the WCAM settlements are
only paid if there is a settlement. The costs of settlement
appear high, but with the exception of Fortis are comparable
to those in the U.S. Also shaping the incentives of lawyers
representing the shareholders is the fact that a greater
proportion of corporate shares in Europe are held by
institutional investors.282 This should lead to a greater
alignment of incentives between shareholders and their
lawyers, as individual shareholders (and the organizations
280. Art. 7:907 ¶ 3(b) BW (Neth.); see van Boom, supra note 98, at 181–82
(detailing the Dutch Judiciary’s initial discomfort over “the open texture of the
fairness criteria” in the WCAM); see also Kamerstukken II 2003/04
(Parliamentary Proceedings Second Chamber 2003/04) 29 414, no. 3 (WCAM
Explanatory Memorandum).
281. See Krans, supra note 89, at 292–93.
282. See Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global
Competition, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191, 195 (2008); see also Armour et al., supra
note 82, at 7–8 (detailing the rise in collective investment both in the U.S. and
Europe).
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representing them) have a greater incentive to object to
positions taken by their lawyers which may fail to serve their
interests to the fullest extent. In settlement negotiations,
lawyers representing both sides are aware that investors
have the right to opt-out of a settlement and press an
individual claim, thereby prompting negotiators on both
sides to work for a settlement that will be perceived as
adequate by shareholders.283 Lawyers’ incentives under the
WCAM may offer some improvement at the margin as
compared to the American system, but they are largely
similar.
D. The Political Economy of the WCAM Securities Settlement
Comparing the WCAM with the American securities
fraud class action then reveals an overarching point of
difference and a number of points of similarity. Because the
settlement mechanism does not provide a means to sue but
only to settle with a defendant, leverage in the negotiation
shifts, often decisively, to the defendant. When the defendant
does have sufficient incentive to settle, however, similarities
with the American securities fraud class action emerge.
Lawyers work for their cut, and the familiar problems of
circularity and questionable deterrent effect appear. And
while within the Netherlands itself procedural and
structural features of the WCAM protect against the ability
of one shareholder representative to undercut others in a
reverse auction scenario, on a transnational basis there is
the possibility that a Dutch settlement can be used to
undercut potential actions in other jurisdictions.
A full comparison of the WCAM with the American
securites fraud class action should also consider the larger
forces that shaped its development as well as its meaning for
securities regulation going forward. Since these forces have
a large admixture of the political, as well as accidental
factors, in addition to purely economic ones, they fall under
283. See Arons & van Boom, supra note 195, at 872–73.
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the rubric of “political economy” broadly considered. While
the use of this term by law and economics-minded scholars
seems to have a pejorative connotation,284 indicating interest
group, institutional, or other political forces that cause a
regulatory regime to deviate from the ideal of efficiency, such
forces are of course operative in shaping any real-world
regulatory system. Whether construction of a regulatory
system in the absence of all political-economic forces would
even be possible, and normatively desireable if it were, is
beyond the scope of this article. Be that as it may, in addition
to more traditional economic forces, political and
jurisprudential considerations, as well as matters of chance,
have shaped the development of the WCAM’s application to
securities cases. Political-economic factors are also
important to the larger significance of the WCAM for
securities regulation and international financial law.
It must be remembered that the WCAM was enacted into
Dutch law to provide a mechanism for settling mass tort
cases, not securities cases.285 Its application to securities
claims occurred when Royal Dutch/Shell, which was a
defendant in Federal District Court in New Jersey, sought
another forum to resolve claims of non-U.S. shareholders.286
It was subsequently used by enterprising American lawyers
seeking a vehicle for mass claims that would not survive in
American courts under the then-prevailing “conduct and
284. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Rhetoric and Reality: A Historical
Perspective on the Regulation of Foreign Private Issuers, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 619,
621 (2010); William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud
on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 75 (2011); Merritt B. Fox, The Political
Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for
Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696 (1998).
285. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. The Dutch Parliament’s
Explanatory Memorandum explains that while the immediate reason for the
passage of the WCAM statute is to allow for compensation in the DES case, it is
intended to be a statute of general application to “mass damages” cases. There is
however no mention of its application to securities cases. See Kamerstukken II
2003/04 (Parliamentary Proceedings Second Chamber 2003/04) 29 414, no. 3
(WCAM Explanatory Memorandum).
286. See Hensler, supra note 103, at 180–81.
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effects” test. Its use in securities cases is serendipitous,
then—while resourceful lawyers would have likely tested it
sooner or later, the Dutch Parliament enacting the statute
does not appear to have considered the application of the law
to securities cases. On the other hand, the development of
the securities settlements under the WCAM is not only
driven by chance but also by economic rationality, since it
offers a cost-effective means for a corporation to buy closure
when faced with numerous similar damages claims.287 And
principles of justice must be counted as a third causal factor.
In Converium, the court emphasizes the principle of treating
like cases alike in order to justify its expansive interpretation
of the jurisdictional law before it.288 This is an important
jurisprudential
principle
ultimately
grounded
in
289
deontological reasoning;
in the legal literature it comes
under the rubric of “fairness.”290 Furthermore, the
development of the WCAM as a means of settling securities
cases can be justified on the grounds of providing “access to
justice” for shareholders harmed by corporate fraud.291 While
the American experience with securities fraud class actions
raises serious questions as to the genuineness of this justice,
they can and do provide compensation to defrauded
investors. Beyond that, the class action lawsuit serves an
important symbolic function in securities regulation.292

287. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
289. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–78 (1977); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 208 (rev. ed. 1991) (“The rule of law implies the
precept that similar cases be treated similarly.”).
290. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Moral and Legal Luck: Lucky in Your Judge, 9
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 185, 191–92 (2008); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic
Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 74–76 (1989).
291. See Arons & van Boom, supra note 195, at 859; see also Beyea, supra note
39, at 567; Hensler, supra note 65, at 970.
292. See Note, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud
Class Actions, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1085 (2019); see also COFFEE, supra note
106, at 227 (discussing the role of symbolic justice in the securities class action
context).
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In addition to factors of chance, economics, and justice,
the policy justifications used by the courts in key decisions
have also been important in the development of the WCAM
as a mechanism for settling securities disputes. As explored
by Professors Kaal and Painter, the WCAM can be seen as
an example of forum competition in securities regulation.293
While in hindsight they appear to overstate the similarity of
the WCAM securities settlement and its American
counterpart, because the lack of a means to bring a mass
claim under the WCAM against an unwilling defendant
represents a fundamental and often decisive difference with
the American regime, their theory of forum competition is
supported by the self-understanding of both the American
and Dutch courts. As detailed in Part I above, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Morrison believed that it was appropriate
to hand off foreign securities cases to other jurisdictions that
it believed had a closer connection to them.294 While Justice
Scalia’s opinion grounds this position in the doctrine of
comity, it was also likely influenced by the economic
argument for rejecting the conduct and effects test presented
by Professors Choi and Silberman.295 And from the Dutch
side, Shell Petroleum and Converium show the Amsterdam
Court of Appeals understanding its role as complementary to
the U.S. courts in the wake of Morrison.296 In the recent
Petrobras action, the Rotterdam Court of First Instance
appears to have taken forum competition even further. In
distinction to Judge Rakoff in the Southern District of New
York, the Rotterdam court ruled that the arbitration
provision in the Petrobras Bylaws was defective, thereby

293. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 83; see also Hensler, supra note 65, at 969.
294. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
295. Indeed, the Morrison decision cites Choi and Silberman. See Morrison v.
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 250 (2010) (citing Stephen J. Choi & Linda
J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class Actions, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 465 (2009)); see also Beyea, supra note 39, at 551 n.86.
296. See Shell Petroleum, supra note 131, ¶¶ 3.11–14, 3.25; Converium I, supra
note 156, ¶ 2.5; Converium II, supra note 157, ¶ 6.4.2.
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permitting the claim under DCCP 3:305 to proceed.297 On
both the part of the Dutch and American courts then, a
doctrine of complementarity and even competition should be
counted as a policy choice (albeit one grounded in an
economic argument) driving the development of this law.
A further matter of political economy, as pointed out by
Professor Langevoort and others, has also been important in
the development of the WCAM.298 This is that the U.S.
economy contains a significantly higher number of retail
investors than the European ones. As a consequence, the
importance of allowing an opt-out class action is greater in
the U.S. context than in Europe, because a larger proportion
of the shares of an American company will be held by
shareholders with negative value claims. In Europe, by
contrast, a larger proportion of a corporation’s shares will be
held by investors with an incentive to bring individual claims
against a corporation they believe has defrauded them.
Furthermore, in the context of a WCAM settlement, many of
these institutional investors have an incentive to join a
shareholder representative such as VEB, or a stichting, and
to press for a settlement providing substantial compensation.
A corporation involved in settlement talks under the WCAM
will therefore be incentivized to offer a generous enough
settlement to satisfy the shareholder representatives as well
as shareholders not represented by any foundation who have
the right to opt-out of any settlement.299 In distinction to the
American securities class action then, the relatively greater
concentration of ownership in institutional investors in
Europe may have the effect of balancing the disparity of
bargaining power created by the lack of a right to sue
collectively as well as policing the conduct of the lawyers
involved on the shareholder side.

297. See supra notes 210–15 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
299. See Arons & van Boom, supra note 195, at 872–73; Krans, supra note 89,
at 298–99.
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A final consideration of political economy in the WCAM
securities cases concerns their significance for the system of
international securities regulation. The application of the
WCAM to securities cases appears to be an example of
Professor Brummer’s “conservation theory of international
financial law,” under which regulatory power is not
destroyed but rather transferred.300 As Morrison shut the
doors of the U.S. courts to foreign securities claims, the
Netherlands experimented with hosting them. Furthermore,
insofar as they complement the American securities fraud
class action, they can be seen as an example of a loose sort of
convergence in international financial law.301 While the
pressures toward convergence are less in securities law than
other areas of financial regulation, and what convergence
there is is less complete, the past decade has witnessed the
rapid development of a number of national legal regimes to
handle securities fraud cases collectively.302 While the Dutch
experience cautions that problems of circularity and effective
deterrence will likely remain after a mass claim (or
settlement) procedure is enacted, considerations of both
economic efficiency and access to justice have prompted a
host of countries to implement some form of collective action,
usually opt-in, for securities fraud cases. In distinction to our
present anti-global mood, these considerations appear to
have prompted some convergence in national regimes of
securities regulation. The American and Dutch regimes are
just two of these systems, but they are among the most
important as they represent (in the Dutch case, through the
operation of the convention on judgments) the largest
economic blocks of the Western world.

300. See Chris Brummer, Territoriality as a Regulatory Technique: Notes from
the Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 499, 524 (2011).
301. See Armour et al., supra note 82, at 21–22.
302. See Coffee, supra note 2; Hensler, supra note 65; Kistenbroker et al., supra
note 66.
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CONCLUSION
The story of Morrison, the WCAM, and the growth of the
international securities settlement is complex. Morrison is
driven by both Justice Scalia’s jurisprudential commitments
as well as the fear that the U.S. courts had become a
“Shangri-La” for the securities fraud class action.303 For
scholars who have long voiced criticisms of the U.S.
securities fraud class action regime on economic grounds,
Morrison and the WCAM settlement mechanism are both
something to applaud: Morrison because it closes the
courtroom doors for those suits with the least obvious
connection to the United States, and the WCAM because its
experiment fundamentally reshuffles the balance of power
between corporations and the legal representatives of the
shareholders. While economics are not the only driving factor
in this development, the WCAM does represent an important
instance of regulatory competition. A close look at the WCAM
and the settlements under it, however, shows that the Dutch
regime offers only a crude sort of improvement on its
American counterpart: its denial of a cause of action in a
mass claim greatly reduces the amount of cases in the
system, but those that do settle are still fundamentally
circular and have questionable deterrent effect. The WCAM
is an interesting and important development in global
securities regulation, but investors and corporate issuers will
have to await a future era less hostile to supra-national
regulation for a more sophisticated alternative to the
American securities class action.

303. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270 (2010).

